QUESTIONS · OF · THE · DAY

?

German Ambitions

As they affect Britain and The United States of America


REDWOOD
WITHDRAWN
LIBRARY
NEWPORT
R.I.
Gift of
John C. Chadwick

F. E. C.

Combs. & regards

W. M. T.

New York Aug 21 03

GERMAN AMBITIONS

AS THEY AFFECT

BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GERMAN AMBITIONS

AS THEY AFFECT

BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

REPRINTED, WITH ADDITIONS AND NOTES, FROM
THE *SPECTATOR*

BY

'VIGILANS SED ÆQUUS'

REDWOOD LIBRARY
NEWPORT, R. I.

NEW YORK: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
LONDON: SMITH, ELDER, & CO.
1903

9,

DEC 1 2 1922 B

F°FG
.V68

INTRODUCTION

It is with great pleasure that I respond to the invitation of 'Vigilans sed Æquus' to write a few words of introduction to his Letters, originally published in the *Spectator*.

I am proud that those Letters should have appeared first in my paper, and I feel it no small honour to be associated with them on the occasion of their production in book form.

I

Two objections will, in all probability, be made to the publication of these Letters. The first is that the foundation upon which they are based is not of sufficient solidity and importance. That is, it will be said 'Why should anyone trouble about what is said by obscure German pamphleteers in

regard to matters of high politics?' Those who argue thus are probably ignorant of the mass of political literature upon which 'Vigilans sed Æquus' has based his Letters, and so miss the force of the useful metaphor first employed, if I remember rightly, by Coleridge: 'Each grain of gunpowder by itself is small, smutty, and so contemptible, but in the mass how dangerous!' We have not to consider the importance of each German pamphleteer by himself, but the trend of the whole body of literature analysed by 'Vigilans sed Æquus.' To ignore its significance when viewed in bulk would be extremely foolish. In my view, too, the significance of these political writings is rendered greater not less, because they are published in a country with an autocratic government like that of Germany.

It is a capital error to suppose that autocratic governments are less influenced by abstract expressions of thought and by political theorists than popular governments. The very reverse is frequently the case. The political theorist often finds it impossible to get the great public to attend to him, but if he can catch the ear and so affect

the mind of one or two men in an autocracy, he will very often succeed in influencing the action of the State in spite of the greater public opinion being indifferent or even against him.

In Germany, too, the ruling classes have always shared the tendency of Germans as a whole to be moved by abstract ideas, and again and again in German history we find that great policies have been first urged by obscure pamphleteers and minor political philosophers, and have afterwards been adopted by their rulers. Thus, though public opinion does not in our sense control the German Government, political writings very often produce most important results.

To rule out the writings of the men on whom 'Vigilans sed Æquus' has based his Letters because they are obscure, or perhaps I should rather say because their names are not known in England, is to misunderstand the evolution of public affairs in Germany.

II

Another objection which is certain to be raised to a book like the present is that it tends

'to stir up ill-feeling between two great nations.' Needless to say that is the very last thing that anyone connected with the publication of these Letters would wish to do. But in truth to urge such an objection is to fail to grasp the causes that produce wars and hostile acts between nations. What makes one nation the enemy of another nation is not plain speaking, but the misunderstanding of national desires and aspirations. The risk of collision will be infinitely greater if we do not find out the direction in which the German ship of State is being steered than if we understand the course that is laid for her. To look the facts in the face, whether agreeable or disagreeable, is essential to our national safety, and it is because 'Vigilans sed Æquus' enables the British public to look the facts in the face that his book is so valuable. Remember he does not talk at large upon what he considers to be German aspirations, but supports every statement with the *ipsissima verba* of German writers.

It is only by understanding German aspirations and the foundations of German policy and

statecraft that we can tell how to act in particular circumstances. For example, if our Government had understood the real aspirations of Germany in the Caribbean Sea and towards South America, and had also realised the intense anxiety of America in regard to the German world policy, they would never have entered upon an alliance with Germany over our claims against Venezuela.

III

I have only one more word to add, and that is to protest most strongly against the notion that, because one deals with and sets forth the aspirations of Germany considered as a State, one is hostile to the German people.

I disclaim for myself, and for the writer of these letters, any such notion. I hold that the German people have done some of the greatest work ever done in the world, both physical and intellectual. The fact that they, or rather a portion of them, are now engaged in the pursuit of aspirations which bring them into rivalry with this

country, does not in the slightest degree alter their moral and intellectual greatness.

The Germans are not wicked because they have adopted political ideas that are contrary to British interests, or even because they are anxious to play the part of separating Russia and England as the only safeguard for Germany. But, though these things are not the proof of wickedness in Germans, they ought to be the cause of vigilance in Englishmen.

One may admire the greatness and worth of the German Empire, applaud the patriotism as well as the versatility of the German Emperor, and recognise the courage and the steadfastness, the domestic soundness, and the high intelligence of the German people—and all these things I do most sincerely recognise—without being precluded from saying that Germany is a dangerous ally to Britain, that German aspirations conflict with ours, and that Germany in her dread of Russia is systematically trying to embroil us with that Power. Those who doubt these assertions should surely study the facts, and not repeat in a flurry of ignorance that those who draw attention to the

facts are 'trying to stir up ill-feeling between two great nations.' This is a piece of political cant from which our statesmen cannot too soon clear their minds.

J. ST. LOE STRACHEY.

April 9, 1903.

PREFACE

To judge from what Mr. Balfour said at Liverpool the other day,[1] the keynote struck in this book may possibly excite some astonishment in English readers. They are conscious of no antipathy to Germany—have, indeed, the greatest possible respect, often even affection, for the Germany of Dürer, Goethe, and Beethoven; and if they do not feel quite the same for the Germany of Bismarck, who was 'everything else, but no educator of his people' (Delbrück), still desire to be just to Germany's great achievements in the world. It is, of course, perfectly easy for the German writers from whom I have drawn to quote tributes of contemporary English *savants* to

[1] Speech of February 13, 1903: 'I do not in the least understand, and I have never been able to understand, the causes which have produced dislike to England in Germany.

German achievement and German thought, and one of the most abusive of them [1] fortifies his assertions of German superiority by quotation from the English Jevons. He does not appear to see what a contrast he thereby establishes between his own method and the English one—or, for that matter, the French one, for did not that great French scholar, whom the world has just lost untimely—Gaston Paris—tell a student who asked him what should be his first step to the study of Old French, 'Learn German'?

It is true that the Pan-German literature from which I have quoted does not claim attention by the talent of its propagandists. But its productions are widely read, and appear to meet a popular demand, and Delbrück bears witness to its influence when he calls Pan-Germanism 'an extremely dangerous and mischievous phenomenon.' Moreover, the settled illwill which the following pages will reveal at every turn is by no means confined to obscure Pan-Germans. Most of my authorities are University Professors

—men who would speak under a full sense of responsibility to their hearers, and on whose consciousness is stamped the saying of Von Sybel—'What the Professors reasoned out, that Bismarck achieved.' Their chosen exemplar is Treitschke—that 'supreme educator of our nation' (Von Bernhardy), 'that fiery herald of our new Empire' (Moulin-Eckart)—who devoted all the resources of a mordant rhetoric, a pitiless invective, and a vitriolic ridicule to making Britain odious and contemptible in the eyes of the generation which heard him with enthusiasm in the class-room and read his books as a gospel. His influence on his generation was that of a Macaulay, a Froude, and a Freeman rolled into one, and perhaps Mr. Balfour would find the readiest answer to his problem in a reading of the works of the man whose final message to his countrymen was that 'the modern world will no longer tolerate a quite rotten state of things, and I hope to live to see the collapse of the British maritime supremacy.'

No doubt, as a government dealing with a

government, Germany can be very pleasant. But in the long run even absolute governments are swayed by the mass of their populations, and the question is what average German opinion, even instructed, even professorial opinion thinks about us and about the United States. I have quoted a good many strange things from this opinion in the following pages, but I could easily have added to their number, if my object had been to furnish forth a chamber of horrors and to make my readers' flesh creep. My sole aim has been to state the facts and diagnose a morbid state. It is not my fault if the higher virtues of what the Germans call 'Publizistik'—impartiality, the constant effort to put oneself in the place of the nation criticised, and to allow for the *pros* as well as the *cons* in its national conduct—are missed as a rule in my quotations. Men like Delbrück, Marcks, Arndt, and Anton are, of course, exceptions, but I am speaking of the great majority.

Apart from mere trade jealousy and other unavowable reasons for disliking us, this great majority believes and inculcates that Britain's

foreign policy is always purely selfish and dictated solely by considerations of our commerce and dominion. In the Seven Years' War Britain left Prussia in the lurch (Bismarck's phrase) and consciously made use of that war in order to extend and consolidate the British Empire. Since then, according to these authorities, Britain has been steadily hostile to Prussia's development, and was against her in 1864, 1866, and 1870. The well-meant but ill-informed blundering of the majority of British statesmen is described as deep and subtle Machiavellism, and Gladstone, of all men, is called 'an enemy to all German development.' Of course, nations may, and do, act on the central line of their permanent interests without definite intention or even clearly knowing what they are about. But the immense impression made on English readers by Seeley's 'Expansion of England' clearly proved that Englishmen had not as a rule anticipated the doctrine of the book. The old-fashioned Liberal view, as often expounded by John Bright, had been that Britain was perpetually interfering with Continental quarrels which did not

concern her, and that she would have been much better off if she had left the French Republic and Napoleon alone. Goethe, on the other hand, anticipated Seeley when, after reading Sir Walter Scott's 'Napoleon,' he said that 'the main thing he had learnt from the book was that England never intervened for any but English interests.' 'Who else at that time,' is Ratzel's comment, 'saw through the English policy? The majority saw in England only the champion of European independence.' Of course the truth, as usual, lies midway between the two extremes. 'The majority' may have done Britain too much credit, but there was more generous feeling at the back of Britain's policy and less conscious national selfishness than a careless or prejudiced reader of Seeley—whose book has been widely read by Germans, and has had an exasperating effect upon them—would imagine. The fact is that there is no book more needed than a comprehensive history of British foreign policy during the last two centuries, written in a thoroughly scientific spirit but doing justice to

the British point of view; and a youthful historian of capacity who wanted a subject for the centre of his life's work could desire no worthier or more useful theme than this.

It may have been noticed that I use the term 'Britain' to describe the State of Great Britain and Ireland. 'England' omits both Scotland and Ireland; 'Great Britain' omits Ireland; it seems to me that the time has come to revert to the practice of the Roman geographers at the beginning of our era, who spoke of these islands as 'the Britains,' and, in writing of the British State, to use the comprehensive term of 'Britain.'

In conclusion, I have to thank the Editor of the *Spectator* for the triple obligation he has laid me under—in the first place by admitting these studies to the publicity, at once wide and choice, of his Review; in the second place, by the kind permission to republish; and, in the third place, by the weighty Introduction, to which I have the honour of directing the special attention of my readers.

'VIGILANS SED ÆQUUS.'

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I.

GERMANY AND BRITAIN.

PAGE

The Fleet-literature—Position in which Germany finds herself—The German Dread—The Great exclusive States—Will Britain follow their Example?—Why British Colonies will not meet the German Need—German 'Successes'—German Qualms—The Historical Grievance—Zanzibar and Samoa—British and German National Self-conceit 1

CHAPTER II.

GERMAN EXPECTATIONS AND ASPIRATIONS.

German Fears and Hopes—The Twentieth Century one of Sea-wars—and Trade-wars—A Future of Bad Trade and Dear Food—Central European Zollverein proposed—'Greater Germany'—Holland and Germany—Russia and the United States—Germany and South America—German Aspirations at the Expense of the British Empire 20

CHAPTER III.

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES.

The Question of the Danish Islands in the West Indies—Importance of the Islands—Germany and the United States as possible Rival Competitors for them—The Monroe Doctrine ignored or misunderstood—The Monroe Doctrine defied—Other Causes of possible Alienation

PAGE

between Germany and the United States—Trade between the United States and Germany—Proposed European Tariff-war with the United States 34

CHAPTER IV.

GERMANY AND HOLLAND.

The Controversy in Holland—What would Germany gain from Customs Union?—What would Holland gain?—What Holland might lose—Other Dutch Reasons against Union—How Germany can bring Pressure to bear on Holland—The Dutch are not Germans—Dutch Language—Dutch Mission in the World—Dutch Sympathies for France—Holland and Germany are diverging . . . 52

CHAPTER V.

GERMANY, RUSSIA, AND THE EAST.

Russia the German Nightmare—Has the Russian Colossus Feet of Clay?—Should Germany conquer Russia, what would be the Terms of Peace?—German Element shrinking on its Eastern Frontier—Germany and Asia Minor—Dangerous Convergence of Germany and Russia on the Lower Euphrates—German Views on Egypt—The Pulo Lantar Islands—China—German Repudiation of any special British Claim to the Yang-tsze—The Yellow Peril 68

CHAPTER VI.

GERMANY AND BRITAIN ONCE MORE.

The Pan-Germanic Literature—Germans on Germany—Germans on Britain—The British Fleet—Livonius's Unfavourable View—Invasion possible—Another German View, Invasion impossible—The Moral, Britain and the United States should hold together 82

APPENDIX 99

INDEX 123

GERMAN AMBITIONS

CHAPTER I

GERMANY AND BRITAIN

'Mit Oesterreich, mit Frankreich, mit Russland haben wir bereits abgerechnet; die letzte Abrechnung mit England wird voraussichtlich die langwierigste und die schwierigste sein.'—TREITSCHKE.

'Der Deutsche ist von Natur, nachdem er seinen einfachen grossen Charakter verloren hat, afterrednerisch und verunglimpfend und nichts weniger als liebend.'—NIEBUHR.

'"Oh! go to sleep," said Cynthia [the English heroine of "Cynthia's Way," to her German friend Wanda], out of patience. "You're very nice individually, but collectively, when you begin to talk about us, you're wild asses braying in the wilderness."'—MRS. ALFRED SIDGWICK.

The Fleet-literature—Position in which Germany finds herself—The German Dread—The Great exclusive States—Will Britain follow their Example?—Why British Colonies will not meet the German Need—German 'Successes'—German Qualms—The Historical Grievance—Zanzibar and Samoa—British and German National Self-conceit.

The Fleet-literature.

ONE of the strongest permanent impressions left by the late war was that of the depth and truculence of German ill-will to Britain which it incidentally revealed. The outburst of bile was too universal and too acrid

to be explained by the war alone. The war only tapped a reservoir of ill-will, which had clearly been accumulating for a long time and was mainly due to other causes. What those causes were, and how Germans explain and justify their attitude, cannot be matters of indifference to us, and no better source of information is available than the propaganda for a great increase of the German Fleet which has been going on for the last five years, and which has secured adherents among the best-known names in Germany. In that way a regular Fleet-literature of books, pamphlets, and magazine articles has sprung up which throws a flood of light on the German temper, attitude, and aspirations. To discuss the Fleet and to advocate its great and rapid increase means to discuss trade and colonies, and above all the relation of Germany to Britain, whose name recurs on almost every page. So it becomes possible to form a diagnosis alike of the present temper and of the future aspirations of the Germans. This letter will deal with the present, and with the past so far as it has prepared the present. My method will be one of quotation—

literal translation or careful summary. I do not regard it as my business to expound conclusions so much as to supply materials for a judgment on a matter which is important to us. The quotations are typical, and could be multiplied. Nothing is set down in malice, and I have been on the watch for any sign of generosity, good feeling, or even a serious effort to understand us. My chief authorities are the following :—

Dehn.—'Kommende Weltwirthschaftspolitik,' 1898.

Dix.—'Deutschland auf den Hochstrassen des Weltwirthschaftsverkehrs,' 1901.

Livonius, Vice-Admiral.—'Die deutsche Nordsee Flotte und die englische Seemacht,' in *Deutsche Revue* for February, 1902.

Marcks.—'Deutschland und England,' 1900. On the whole, an honourable attempt at understanding and conciliation.

'*Nauticus.*'—'Flotten-Frage,' 1898, and 'Flotten-Novelle,' 1900.

Nauticus.'—'Jahrbuch für Deutschlands Seeinteressen,' annually since 1899, 4 vols. published. In imitation of Lord Brassey's *Naval Annual*, but covering a wider field. Apparently there are several contributors.

Rathgen.—'Die Kundigung des englischen Handels-

vertrags und ihre Gefahr für Deutschlands Zukunft,' 1897.

Ratzel.—'Das Meer als Quelle der Völkergrösse,' 1900. A broad and sweeping survey by one of the first of living geographers.

Schiemann.—'Deutschland und die grosse Politik anno 1901.' A series of annual surveys of foreign politics since 1896, comparable to Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff's Elgin discourses, except in fairness and ability. This Berlin Professor informs the world that we tried to involve Europe in war over Armenia and over Crete,[1] and that we perpetrated 'two unsuccessful robber-raids,' in the Transvaal and in—Venezuela! But in a day of small mercies we should be thankful for this gentleman's admission (p. 389) that 'the story of the covering of British troops by Boer women at Graspan is certainly untrue,' the more so as a man like Delbrück, editor of the chief German review, and, compared to the ordinary German journalist, as Hyperion to a Satyr, has repeated the slander on the ground—only to be paralleled by the excuse given by Charles Lamb's schoolboy for an equally unfortunate exploit—that it had never been contradicted![2]

Schmoller, Sering, Wagner, Francke, Voigt, &c., in 'Handels- und Machtpolitik,' 2 vols., 1900. Almost all the writers are university professors.

Schurtz.—'Kolonialmüdigkeit,' in the *Grenzboten* for September 11, 1902.

[1] See Note 1, p. 99.

[2] See Note 2, p. 101.

Von Brandt.—'Koloniale Schmerzen' in *Deutsche Rundschau* for September, 1902. The writer was formerly German Minister at Pekin.

I will now proceed to my summaries and quotations, only premising one thing, and that is that the whole of this German discussion starts from and revolves round the Fleet Bill of 1898, the object of which was declared in the preamble to be to make war with Germany so dangerous, even for the strongest naval Power, as to bring that Power's own position into question. With that object, the German fleet is to be brought by the year 1920 to a total strength of thirty-eight battleships, twenty large cruisers, and forty-five small ones; in other words, from the sixth or seventh place among naval Powers to the third, or even second.

Position in which Germany finds herself.

The essential point is that Germany has become dependent upon sea-borne trade. Her own harvest no longer feeds her. For a hundred and two days out of the yearly three hundred and sixty-five Germany is fed on foreign corn; or the same fact is expressed differently in the statement

that a fifth to a quarter of her population is so fed. She is also irrevocably tied to a great import of tropical food products and raw materials, tropical and other. The case is not so bad as in England, which has abandoned her agriculture to ruin (Schmoller), which is 'uprooted from its soil and exclusively dependent on imports' (Voigt). It is a pity, by the way, that these worthy professors have not read Koenig's excellent book on 'Die Lage der englischen Landwirthschaft,' 1896. If they had, they would have learnt from it that in England the worst of the agrarian crisis has been overcome, and that the outlook in Germany is less hopeful, if only because she has not the sea-climate which enables England to turn from wheat to pasture at a moment's notice; Germany could not grow the grass even if she wanted to. But whatever may be the truth with England, the German case is serious enough. She is 'estranged from her mother-earth to a formidable extent' (Voigt). She must import on a great scale, and she can only pay for her imports by a great export trade. 'Here we are,' writes Sering, 'a people of nearly

sixty millions, on a territory smaller than Texas, with a yearly increment of 800,000 souls, with a gigantic export industry and foreign trade—threatened in the highest degree by the policy of exclusion and annexation on which the world-Empires have embarked.' The facts of population (or emigration) point in the same direction—to the vital and primary importance of 'overseas.' Germany sent out five or six millions of her children in the nineteenth century, and lost them. Is she to send out twenty millions in the twentieth century, and lose them too? If she is not to lose them, there must be German colonies for them to go to (Schmoller). Plantation colonies are also needed in tropical regions to grow the tropical products which Germany requires. From every point of view we come round to the same conclusion. Germany is absolutely dependent on foreign trade, and that trade cannot be regarded as secure unless protected by a great Fleet.

The German dread.

In all this Fleet-literature no term recurs so often as 'blockade.' That is what the Germans fear. An effective blockade of her Northern ports, coupled with war on

her East and West frontiers, would make it impossible for Germany to feed herself, or to pay for food, supposing she could get it. The gains of the last twenty-five years would be lost for Hamburg and for Germany, and England would regain her old position of trade-supremacy ('Nauticus'). The 'Flotten-Novelle' of 'Nauticus' begins with a long article on 'The Blockade Peril,' and the *Spectator's* article of January 16, 1897, on the same subject is translated in full in the 'Flotten-Frage.' To avert blockade, cruisers are of no use; none but battleships will do ('Nauticus' and Ratzel).

The great exclusive States.

Short of war and blockade, the nightmare which haunts the German imagination is provided by the tendency to great exclusive trading areas which the Germans perceive in Russia, the United States, and France; and which they apprehend, however gratuitously, from Britain. 'We live in a period of world-Empires with a tendency to exclusive trade-areas. A new age of mercantilism, with trade-wars and campaigns of conquest, has dawned' (Francke in 'Handels- und Machtpolitik'). Sering,

writing in the same book, admits that Britain is not responsible for the new tendencies in economic policy. It is Russia and the United States who are the culprits, the one seeking to monopolise the Asiatic and the other the American continent. Where the Yankees rule the end of European imports is at hand. And France is as bad. Her Colonial Empire is no small thing, and, like the United States and Russia, it approaches the ideal of the closed trade-State.

Will Britain follow their example?

Nothing, however, much matters so long as Britain remains faithful to Free-trade. Of Germany's total export trade 27 per cent. goes to Britain and her colonies and dependencies. But the Germans, or at all events the Professors, have convinced themselves on very insufficient evidence that a British Zollverein is in sight. 'The idea of a British Zollverein, including the Mother-country and all her colonies, but barring out the foreigner with high walls of duty, grows as the British Empire grows' (Francke). In 1895 the Liberal Government refused the differential treatment offered by

Rhodesia (Rathgen, who writes as if the proposal applied to all our colonies). But in 1897 the Canadian tariff reduced—at first by an eighth, after a year by a fourth—her duties in favour of all countries which admitted Canadian products free. That sounds quite Free-traderish, as all countries can secure that advantage if they will. In reality, it profits only England and New South Wales (Rathgen). Both Rathgen and Dehn advocate the refusal of the 'most-favoured-nation' treatment to England in retaliation for Canada's action, and, indeed, the impression which this apparently small matter has produced in Germany is quite extraordinary. The Germans see in it the beginning of the end. 'If England turns Protectionist, Continental Europe will have to unite in order to avoid being economically trampled on [*brutalizirt*], and the result will probably be war' (Livonius). The peace-keeping action of Free-trade has never been so forcibly illustrated. The British Empire provokes envy as it is, though everybody profits by it. But the mind can hardly grasp the furious hatred and settled rancour it would excite

if a serious attempt were made to confine its benefits to Anglo-Saxondom.[1]

Why British colonies will not meet the German need.

The view of German Free-traders used to be that German colonies were unnecessary, as Germans could trade and settle in British colonies on equal terms. But now Schmoller informs us that Bismarck became a colonies-man when he discovered that the pretended equality for Germans in British colonies was all a sham. In any case, continues Schmoller, what might have been true of the old Free-trade England is not true of the England which talks about a British Zollverein. None of the evidence which is supposed to have converted Bismarck is given, and the statement is oddly at variance with the facts recorded in Schumacher's article on China in the same volumes. Schumacher asserts that Germans own the best houses in Hong-kong. In the Hong-kong and Shanghai Bank, the greatest bank in Asia, out of eleven directors four were Germans, and a German was chairman. In another great institution, the Hong-kong and Whampoa Dock

[1] See Note 3, p. 104.

Company, where all British ships of war in the Far East go for their repairs, three out of seven directors and the chairman are Germans. Not a word is said in recognition of this remarkable liberality, but surely the facts speak for themselves. England has made Hong-kong what it is, and made it for Germans, it would seem, even more than for Englishmen; but its beginnings were difficult and humble, and in 1847 the ex-Treasurer of the Colony laid down as an axiom its 'utter worthlessness in every point of view.'

German 'successes.'

In a recent article, intended to rouse his fellow-countrymen from their 'colony-staleness,' Schurtz argues that if the Germans had acquired their colonies only to prevent them from falling into the hands of other people, that would be good business. 'We have already,' he says, 'done two big things. Our possessions in South-West and East Africa have baulked England's scheme for the amalgamation of South and East Africa into a great colonial Empire under Anglo-Saxon direction. To us, moreover, is due the failure of the Australian plan for bringing New Guinea, Melanesia, and Samoa

under Australian influence. No doubt,' he goes on, 'the economic development of our colonies would have been greater in English hands. The Rhodes plan of a Cape-Cairo railway, and the actual rapid construction of the Uganda railway make our beginnings look small. But we should think of the future; and there are other successes of the same kind to console us. We have prevented England from settling herself permanently in Shanghai; we have as good as secured a naval station on the Red Sea, and another on the Straits of Malacca is in view.' Dix also alludes to this Malacca scheme, mentioning the Pulo Lantar islands as a possible coaling-station. A still bigger success could be achieved in Egypt should England prove refractory. Germany need only join France and Russia to make the English occupation untenable (Schiemann). The occupation of Egypt, chimes in Ratzel, is a result of the old exclusive sea power (now becoming obsolete), which in an era of the multiplication and consolidation of medium sea powers has no prospect of permanent success.

Symptoms of a less confident state of mind

are not, however, wanting. Von Brandt, ex-Ambassador at Pekin, warns the Anglophobes that in this domain Germany has to win her spurs, and that a little more modesty would be in place. Bismarck's idea of leaving the development of the German protectorates to private enterprise failed because the German lacks enterprise and lacks capital, and is absurdly jealous of the English capital that might be had. In much the same vein the Munich Professor Fuchs tells his countrymen to take a lesson from English pride instead of talking about the nation of shopkeepers. 'A little less uncritical exultation,' he begs, 'over our commercial and industrial superiority, which in part is no superiority at all, and a little more sensitiveness to the national honour.' The trade outlook is not too rosy, and Germany is only making up for the lost opportunities of the past. Nor do Von Brandt and Fuchs stand alone. In his *Grenzboten* article on 'Colony Staleness,' Heinrich Schurtz puts the dots on the 'i's.' 'We are passing through a period of weariness of the colonies. The fiasco of our colonial efforts is proclaimed from all sides. Cries of

German qualms.

despair and of the deepest discouragement cross and strengthen one another. It is a sudden collapse, like that of the Venice Campanile. Worst of all, these voices come not from the old obstructives, but from the disillusionised younger generation. It is the hate of love betrayed.'

The historical grievance.

The historical grievance is perhaps more serious than Englishmen are accustomed to admit. In its recent review of Mr. George Peel's book on 'The Enemies of England,' the *Times* made an extraordinary admission. Mr. Peel explains the German enmity as due to our abandonment of the alliance of Frederick the Great against the desire of Chatham. The statement, says the *Times*, is 'very inadequate:'—

'England, through Lord Bute, did not merely abandon Frederick, she betrayed him. The conduct of Lord Bute in breaking away from the alliance with Frederick the Great has never been properly dealt with by English historians. Mr. Lecky seems to have had no conception of its importance, and Lord Stanhope, although he realised how grave the matter was, does not tell

the whole story. The real reason why England has never been forgiven in Germany for her conduct to Prussia is that Lord Bute, the Prime Minister of England, did not scruple to betray to Choiseul the plans of Frederick, then the ally of England, for military operations against the French.'

Happily, there is a great deal to be said for Bute, as will appear from the letter of Mrs. D'Arcy Collyer, quoted in Note 4.[1] But even a German, when he is a candid man and a serious historian, can be found to say something on our side. 'In the Seven Years' War,' says Marcks, 'Prussia's very existence was at stake. Frederick, it is true, often complained of England's lukewarmness, and was tempted to refuse her humiliating subsidies. Bute dropped him [the *Times* goes much further], and it was not his fault that Prussia ended the war without loss of territory. Certainly the alliance was no ideal one. Still, how could Frederick have held his ground without Ferdinand of Brunswick and his army, without the covering of his rear in North-West Germany?'

[1] See p. 106.

From this fair and candid critic we can endure to hear, even though we may not regard the charge as in all respects well founded, that ever since 1848 England has been unfriendly. 'That,' he says positively, 'is the fact. German unity was achieved without, and a little against, England. The historian comprehends the distrust felt for the newcomer in European politics. But he also sees how it affected Germany. The kindred people deeply disappointed her.'

Zanzibar and Samoa.

Coming down to our own day, I find much stress laid in this Fleet-literature on the loss of Zanzibar. The British view was expressed by *Punch*, which described the German cession as 'giving you what is yours, or at least is not *his*.' But that was not at all the German view. The Germans were convinced that Zanzibar *was* theirs, and that Heligoland was by no means an equivalent. Its abandonment, writes Schiemann, was an unpardonable political blunder, and is so regarded in all German lands. In Samoa, Germany was more fortunate, in that she kept her hold upon the group. But the conduct of Britain gave great offence, and

was regarded as insulting and injurious. Samoa and other causes evoked 'an extraordinarily profound ill-will of the whole public opinion of Germany against England before the war' (Schiemann).

There is not much left to say. One can see how the ill-feeling has grown up. But just a word may be said in conclusion about a more general charge. Alluding to the talk of Anglo-Saxondom, and the great claims sometimes made for the future of the English language, Sering makes it a grievance against England that she claims to impose her alleged superior civilisation on other peoples. As a matter of fact, that is a German, not an English, claim, as Czechs, Poles, and Magyars can testify. The English feeling is much more accurately represented by Matthew Arnold's exclamation: 'What should we all be if we had not one another to check us and be learned from? Imagine an English Europe! How frightfully *borné* and dull! Or a French Europe either, for that matter.' Englishmen are not so self-satisfied as Professor Sering imagines. It would be odd

British and German national self-conceit.

if they were, after the half-century's hammering they have had from Carlyle, Ruskin, and Matthew Arnold, not to mention other chastisers of their self-conceit. Not that we are not glad to be Englishmen ; but the patriotic paralytics, to borrow a phrase from a recent correspondence in the *Spectator*,[1] must be looked for elsewhere.

See Note 5, p. 110.

CHAPTER II

GERMAN EXPECTATIONS AND ASPIRATIONS

German Fears and Hopes—The Twentieth Century one of Sea-wars—and Trade-wars—A Future of Bad Trade and Dear Food—Central European Zollverein proposed—'Greater Germany'—Holland and Germany—Russia and the United States—Germany and South America—German Aspirations at the Expense of the British Empire.

German fears and hopes.

In my previous chapter on Germany and Britain I endeavoured to set forth Germany's present economic and political position, and in particular her sentiments towards this country. The 'Fleet-literature,' or propaganda for a great increase of the German Fleet between now and 1920, was my chief source of information. In the present chapter I propose to examine, not the present but the future—German expectations of what the twentieth century will bring forth, and German aspirations. Without ignoring the Fleet-literature, my chief source will be the copious economic and political literature which

has grown up round the German Tariff. Most of Germany's commercial treaties expire at the end of 1903, and 1904 will see, for good or evil, a new departure. Many of the chief economic authorities in Germany, from Schmoller downwards, have taken occasion to expound their views of the prospects of loss and profit which the new century holds out to Germany. A flood of light is thus let in upon German fears and German hopes. The former are chiefly associated with Russia and the United States; the latter with the notion of a Central European Customs Union, and with Holland. As before, I begin with a list of my chief authorities, so as to be able to refer to their works hereafter by their names only :—

Arndt.—'Handelsbeziehungen Deutschlands zu England und den englischen Kolonien,' 1899—a powerful argument against the advantage (to Britain), or even possibility, of a British Zollverein.

'Beiträge zur neuesten Handelspolitik Deutschlands.' Essays by a number of well-known economists, published in 3 vols. by the Verein für Socialpolitik in 1901.

Bley.—'Weltstellung des Deutschtums,' 1897; 'Die alldeutsche Bewegung und die Niederlande,' 1897.

Calwer.—'Die Meistbegunstigung der Vereinigten Staaten der Nordamerika,' 1902.

Dehn.—'Kommende Weltwirtschaftspolitik,' 1898.

Funke.—'Deutsche Siedlung über See—Rio Grande do Sul,' 1902.

'Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um 1950,' von einem Alldeutschen, 1895.

Halle, Ernst von, Professor at the Berlin University.—'Volks- und Seewirtschaft,' 2 vols., 1902.

Hasse, Dr. Ernst, Professor and member of the Reichstag.—'Deutsche Weltpolitik,' 1897.

Hunziker.—'Schweiz,' 1898.

Marcks.—'Deutschland und England,' 1900.

'*Nauticus.*'—'Year-book of German Maritime Interests.'

Pohle, Professor at the Frankfurt Academy.—'Deutschland am Scheidewege,' 1902.

Rathgen.—'Kundigung des englischen Handelsvertrags,' 1897.

Ratzel.—'Das Meer die Quelle der Völkergrösse,' 1900.

Rohrbach.—'Wirtschaftliche Bedeutung Westasiens,' 1902.

Schmoller and others in 'Handels- und Machtpolitik,' 2 vols., 1900.

Schurtz.—'Kolonialmüdigkeit,' in *Grenzboten* for September 11, 1902.

Vetter.—'Schweiz eine "deutsche Provinz,"' 1902.

Wolff, Professor at the Breslau University.—'Das deutsche Reich und das Weltmarkt,' 1901.

In the German view the twentieth century

will in the first place be one of sea-wars rather than land-wars. 'The battles of the future will be by sea' ('Nauticus'). Nine hundred to twelve hundred millions of the European race, in Europe and outside it, will dictate to the world, and their connection with that world will be by sea. That will be the 'most considerable political, economic, and "cultural" fact of the twentieth century' (Schmoller). The modern tendency is for all Great Powers to be sea-Powers as well as land-Powers. The present great naval superiority of Britain is a relic from the past, surviving into the present. The old sharp contrast between sea-Powers and land-Powers is gone. The nineteenth-century wars, which were decided exclusively by land, will soon be looked back upon with wonder (Ratzel).

The twentieth century one of sea-wars.

Most German economists, including even Schmoller, anticipate what they call 'trade wars' from the exclusive policy of Russia, the United States, and Britain (*sic*). They conceive of trade as a bone which two dogs fight over, and which only one dog can have, and

And trade wars.

the great majority of them speak of an increase of imports as if it were a thing to be lamented. Exports alone are, in this view, the index of national prosperity. It is refreshing to come across a Free-trader like Arndt, who refuses to believe in this bogey, and who calls upon Germany and Britain to 'speed onward to the goal *together*;' but he is as one crying in the wilderness.

A future of bad trade and dear food.

All the great industrial States will, in Pohle's view, be competing for a trade which is doomed to diminution and decay. The typical export trade of to-day is the trade of a manufacturing country with one producing food or raw materials; and it is doomed, because countries of the latter type will by degrees come more and more to want their own raw materials and their own food. Then the industrial countries will have to revive their agriculture, and it will be no easy business. There is probably much exaggeration in all this. Not to mention Canada, which all these Germans ignore, an immense extension—four hundred and sixty thousand square kilometres (Wolff)—of the

Argentine wheat-field is possible. The best wheat in the world is now grown in the Hauran, and the supply could be greatly increased with better government. The same applies to Mesopotamia and Asia Minor (Rohrbach). With higher prices, India also could bring some fifty million new acres into the market (Wolff). Still, one of the best of my authorities, Ernst von Halle, confidently predicts a future of dear bread between 1920 and 1950, and something like that is the predominant German view.

Central European Zollverein proposed.

A general hardening of the conditions of life, a general sharpening of the economic struggle, is, then, what most Germans (possibly, quite wrongly) expect of the twentieth century. In particular, they are haunted by the ever-increasing competition which they expect from the United States. How are these dangers to be met? In the first place, by a Central European Zollverein; in the second place, by a commercial, and even political, league between Germany and the 'German outlands'—under which elastic term are included Holland, the German-speaking parts of Switzerland, and

Scandinavia! The Central European Zollverein will include Austria, Italy, Switzerland, Roumania, and as much of the Balkan Peninsula as can be had. The object of the Zollverein is purely commercial—to enlarge the European trade-area in such a way that it can meet the great Protectionist States like Russia and the United States on fairly equal terms—and to attain it is described by Hasse ('Deutsche Weltpolitik') as the 'great task of the present generation.' All this, however, is in the air. Nearer to reality is the proposed amalgamation of the German 'outlands' (Schurtz)—Holland in particular—with the German Empire.

'*Greater Germany.*'

I need not linger over Scandinavia. To call Denmark a 'German outland' is a good joke or a bad one, according to the point of view. As for Sweden, Germany can no doubt have her alliance if she is prepared to guarantee her independence and the integrity of her territory against Russia—not otherwise. Then there is Switzerland, as regards which it is worth noting, by the way, that the only considerable increase in the Swiss export trade of recent

years has been to Britain and her colonies. The trade with Britain has grown from 109,000,000 fr. to 147,000,000 fr., while that with France has fallen from 147,000,000 fr. to 108,000,000 fr. (Francke in 'Verein für Socialpolitik'). The upshot of Hunziker's close-packed essay is that the French language-frontier is advancing, the German receding. The German element in Switzerland is nearly two thirds of the whole; but still the other third—an increasing third—will have its say, and every possible tie of loyalty and honour binds the two—not to say three—races together. Then the Vetter case last year clearly showed that even German Switzerland was wholly opposed to any idea of political amalgamation with Germany, and did not even relish being called 'a German province' in the purely scientific and intellectual sense. These 'outlands' may, in fact, be put aside. All this Pan-Germanic talk is, as wise Germans like Delbrück have not been slow to point out, either very silly or very dangerous. There remains Holland, and here the case is perhaps more serious.

Holland and Germany.

It should be fully and frankly admitted that it is hard upon Germany that the mouths of her chief river should be in alien hands. The total course of the Rhine from the Swiss frontier to Rotterdam is five hundred and fifteen miles, of which four hundred and thirty-five are in Germany (Halle). Germany is Holland's chief customer by far, and Holland also profits by a great transit trade through its territory to Germany from the United States, Russia, and elsewhere. German opinion seems to be coming round to the view that Holland gains too much from this German neighbourhood to remain an alien. Germany wants the enlargement of her trade-area which Holland and, still more, the Dutch colonies would give her. But what inducement has Holland? One German answer to that question is to point to the Transvaal War, and to suggest that the whole position and issue would have been very different if Holland had been in a Customs and Fleet Union with Germany (Halle). Another is to drop hints of future British or American aggression upon Java (Bley). Lest that be not enough, Holland

is reminded that Germany can damage her trade by giving preferential railway rates to the German North Sea ports, and by building a canal between Antwerp and the Rhine (Francke). The fact that Holland is Free-trade, while Germany is Protectionist, is allowed to be a serious difficulty, but not an insuperable one (Halle and Francke). The union proposed is one of Customs and the Fleet. Holland must build more ships, but need have no army, and as regards trade she will be the chief gainer of the two. But this subject is so important, and there is so much still to be said, that I propose to return to it in a separate chapter.

Russia and the United States.

Next to Holland, the chief preoccupation of the German people is with Russia—which 'seems to weigh on our existence like a monstrous peril of the future' (Marcks), and with which 'a great war may be possible, even necessary' ('Grossdeutschland')—and the United States. 'The enemy, the superior opponent in the economic rivalry of the nations is—North America' (Wolff). 'A fifth to a fourth of the American people is wholly or in part of German origin' (Halle); but the German element

is not gaining ground, and it is believed that, unless the German immigration once more increases (which the home Germans are determined, if possible, to prevent), 'the use of the German language in electoral campaigns will not last over the next two Presidential elections' (*ibid.*). The High Protection of the United States causes great exasperation in Germany, and the tendency, therefore, is to sacrifice the commercial treaties with neighbouring nations (under which the United States benefit by the 'most-favoured-nation' clause in the Treaty of 1828), in order to have the power of putting heavy duties on American goods (Calwer). The same temper is shown in another way. 'If there has been talk in the States of a tariff war with Germany, that is mainly due to the provocative fashion in which Germany sought to damage American trade indirectly, while ostensibly maintaining the "most-favoured-nation" treatment' (Calwer, who goes on to make the interesting admission concerning the exclusion of American meat on alleged sanitary grounds, that the motive really at work in Germany was the jealousy of a trade rival). 'The concessions made

by England in the (first) Venezuelan affair rendered England for the first time popular in the States;' and, on the other hand, 'the unfriendliness of German public opinion about Cuba was an undoubted political blunder' (Halle). In this connection I thankfully note the invaluable admission that 'the approximation of the two Anglo-Saxon States since the Cuban war has greatly strengthened both' ('Nauticus,' i. 410).

Much more might be said of the relations of Germany to the United States, and I mean to return to the subject in a future chapter; but before concluding I must add a few facts and quotations throwing light on German expectations and aspirations with regard to South America. 'In more than one respect South America is the land of the future; there is more to be got in South America than there is in Africa' (Schmoller). 'We must at all costs desire that in Southern Brazil, a land of twenty to thirty million Germans may come into being—no matter whether it remains part of Brazil, or forms an independent State, or comes into closer relations with our Empire' (*ibid.*). The excellent

Germany and South America.

Professor does not see that the last alternative is barred by the Monroe Doctrine and the United States; and, indeed, the German misapprehensions of the Monroe doctrine are almost worth a letter to themselves. The total German population in Brazil's southernmost and healthiest province, the Rio Grande do Sul, is 150,000 (Funke). The province is about the size of Prussia, and there is unlimited room for more German colonists (*ibid.*). The Germans keep their language, customs, and religion, intermarry but little with Brazilians, and have large families of the best Teutonic type, boys and girls both hardened by the constant riding and life in the open air (*ibid.*). It is the one German settlement where a considerable population has remained German, and German opinion is unanimous for its maintenance and development.

German aspirations at the expense of the British Empire.

I conclude, by way of keynote, with three typical quotations:—'What is the sense of this seizure of hundreds of islands and thousands of territories in all quarters of the globe? There is no land- or sea-Power capable of maintaining for ever such a system of occupation. A good shove, and the

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

CHAPTER III

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

The Question of the Danish Islands in the West Indies—Importance of the Islands—Germany and the United States as possible Rival Competitors for them—The Monroe Doctrine ignored or misunderstood—The Monroe Doctrine defied—Other Causes of possible Alienation between Germany and the United States—Trade between the United States and Germany—Proposed European Tariff-war with the United States.

In my first two chapters a good deal has been said, though perhaps not so much as to prevent my returning to the subject in a final chapter, on the relations of Germany with Britain. In the present chapter I propose to deal with a subject which even to Englishmen is hardly less important—the relations of Germany with the United States. As before, I begin with a list of my chief authorities:—

Calwer.—'Die Meistbegünstigung der Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika,' 1902.

Dix.—'Deutschland auf den Hochstrassen des Weltwirtschaftsverkehrs,' 1901.

Funke.—'Deutschlands Siedlung über See,' 1902.

Germania Triumphans: 'Rückblick auf die weltgeschichtlichen Ereignisse der Jahre 1900–15' (with a map of the world as redistributed according to Pan-Germanic notions in 1915), 1895.

Halle.—'See- und Volkswirtschaft,' 1902.

Haller.—'Die Förderung des deutschen Ausfuhrhandels, namentlich nach Amerika, 1895.' Candid. The writer was formerly trade-attaché to the German Consulate at Chicago.

'*Nauticus.*'—'Year-book of German Maritime Interests.'

Pohle.—'Deutschland am Scheidewege,' 1902.

Polenz, W. von.—'Der amerikanische Charakter.' In *Deutsche Rundschau* for April, 1903. A remarkable article on the civilisation of the United States.

Pollock, Sir Frederick.—'The Monroe Doctrine' in the *Nineteenth Century* for October, 1902.

Waltershausen, Sartorius von, Professor at the Strasburg University.—'Deutschland und die Handelspolitik der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika,' 1898.

The keynote of this chapter will be that the relations between Germany and the United States have become less easy than they had been. Although this book is intended to deal not so much with questions of the day as with the

main currents of opinion and aspiration that underlie them, I do not, therefore, apologise for starting with a question of recent and urgent practical importance—the transfer, namely, of the Danish islands in the West Indies from their present owner to Germany or to the United States. The *Spectator* of February 21 was responsible for the statement that 'this feeling [American hostility to Germany] had been recently reawakened by the widespread belief that Germany used her influence [at Copenhagen] to prevent the Danes selling their West Indian colonies to the United States.' Naturally, I can adduce no direct German evidence for or against the existence of an intrigue which every German in the secret would be careful to keep out of German print.

The question of the Danish islands in the West Indies.

But the following quotations from two German writers of authority show that the importance, and even the urgency, of the question are fully present to the German mind:—'It would give a powerful impulse to our trade and shipping if we had a port of our own in the West Indies, with trade-emporium

Importance of the islands.

and coaling-station. Such an acquisition is not impossible, as the Danish islands of Sainte Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John have, in a sense, been in the market' (Waltershausen). The same writer goes on to say that the islands are a burden to Denmark, costing her 30,000*l.* a year more than they bring in, and that in 1866 and 1867 they were offered for sale to the United States. A treaty was arranged, but the Senate refused to ratify it. 'Should German diplomacy at Copenhagen prove able to overcome the anti-German resistance of the Danes, now [1898] is the time for us to acquire the islands. The United States are involved with Spain, and have no money to spare.' (The amazing childishness of this last remark makes one think that Sir Frederick Pollock is right in his scepticism as to 'the alleged superior education of German publicists.') 'Moreover, the States have an interest in securing Germany's benevolent neutrality' (*ibid.*).

My other authority, writing four years later, is less sanguine. 'In St. Thomas, Denmark is mistress of an important traffic-centre, in which

the greatest steamship company in the world, the Hamburg-America line, has its own docks, and which forms a first-rate base for great part of the trade with Central America, the West Indies, and the Northern States of South America. Denmark herself gets little satisfaction from her West Indian possessions. But that which is valueless to a country like Denmark may be of very considerable value to a world-Power, particularly if the island gives a footing in a region which gains essentially in importance from the future Isthmian Canal. Previous negotiations have fallen through, mainly because the United States reckoned on getting the Danish inheritance some fine day without paying for it. For the moment the Americans have enough on their hands with Cuba and Puerto Rico, but it would be excessively disagreeable to them if the Danish colonies were to fall into the hands of another Power' (Dix). The Senate may be expected to abandon its objections to purchase, if only for the sake of rounding off the West Indian possessions of the States, as the Danish islands are separated

Germany and the United States as possible rival competitors for them.

by only a couple of hours' steaming from Puerto Rico. Till the middle of the nineteenth century the islands were rich and prosperous, but the awful storm of 1867, followed by earthquakes, cholera, and yellow fever, proved too much for them, and at present St. Thomas is kept going chiefly by the Hamburg line. Still, 'the constantly recurring rumours about negotiations for purchase between Germany and Denmark have not only been expressly contradicted by our Government, but it is also in itself quite unlikely that a deal of that kind should now take place between them. We might have obtained the acquiescence of the United States in such an arrangement in return for our abandonment to them of Tutuila in the final settlement of the Samoan question. Unfortunately, however, that opportunity was allowed to pass, and we must accordingly reconcile ourselves to the prospect that there is left for Germany hardly a single possible footing in front of the entrance of the future Central American Canal' (*ibid.*).

The other quarter in which the relations of the United States and Germany may become

ticklish is Brazil. After lamenting that the German emigrants to the United States are 'politically wholly lost' to Germany, a well-known publicist goes on: 'We could easily have created a domain of our own in Brazil, if the emigration thither had not been for a long time hindered [under the Von der Heydt Rescript] by our Government' (Dix). He admits a difficulty in the predominance of the Latin element in South America, but points out that in at least one Brazilian province the German settlers are massed together and form the majority, so that 'the prospect of colonisation remains still open to us.' The new Emigration Law is specially designed to favour emigration to Brazil. It has called two colonisation societies into existence, one of which, the Hanseatic, has obtained the concession for the transport of four thousand emigrants a year, besides acquiring 1,600,000 acres in the Brazilian province of Santa Catharina. The German-Brazilian Union, with its head-quarters in Berlin and branches in Germany and South Brazil, devotes itself to the maintenance of the German connection. 'It is a matter of course

Brazil.

that German subjects in Brazil can claim the protection of the Mother-country for their rights and property, if endangered by the frequent political disturbances of the Republic; but political relations stop at that point, and the suspicions of the Brazilian Government, which at times puts all sorts of hindrances in the way of the Germans, are devoid of foundation' (*ibid.*). It may be added that the Hanseatic Society has undertaken the preliminary survey for a railway from the coast inwards in the province of Santa Catharina (*ibid.*), and that the larger German schools in Brazil are subsidised by the German Empire (Funke). The whole effort is at present directed to nothing more than the prevention of the Brazilianisation of the Germans in Brazil. It is all quite natural; but it is also quite natural that the Brazilian Government, which has to look on at this systematic effort to prevent a large portion of its subjects from feeling themselves to be first and foremost Brazilians, should entertain 'suspicions.'

It will have been seen that some of these German writers ignore the Monroe Doctrine Others misunderstand it. The prevalent view is

that the Doctrine has a back as well as a front, a reverse as well as an obverse, and that the reverse consists in a sort of self-denying ordinance on the part of the United States, binding them not to interfere in other continents. 'The interference of the States with other continents which has actually taken place should make an end of the Doctrine, but the Americans will not see it' ('Nauticus'). 'One side of the Monroe Doctrine was, no intervention outside America, and that went with the seizure of the Philippines' (*ibid.*). 'The old Monroe Doctrine, the reverse of which was non-interference outside America, is now abandoned and replaced by the formula, "America for the Americans"—*i.e.*, all North, Central, and South America for the United States' (Sering in 'Handels- und Machtpolitik'). But Monroe's Message is plain enough. 'Our policy in regard to Europe,' it says, 'is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its Powers.' What was meant is indicated by the statement that that policy 'was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long desolated that quarter of the

The Monroe Doctrine ignored or misunderstood.

globe.' The only conceivable pledge to which the Monroe Message commits the States is a pledge not to interfere in European wars or internal politics. That does not cover the case of Cuba or the Philippines, and even if it did, the Americans do not think so, which is all that matters. If the obverse of the Monroe Doctrine is attacked—*i.e.*, if any European Power tries to establish political sovereignty over any self-governing portion of the American Continent—the Monroe Doctrine will come into play, and the play will be serious.

The Monroe Doctrine defied.

The writers I have so far quoted were clearly trembling on the verge of open defiance of the Monroe Doctrine, but it was not thought prudent to cross the line. Another publication of the Pan-German Union in which the line is crossed, and a strong appeal is made to Germany not merely to ignore the Monroe Doctrine, but to defy it, is by Dr. W. Wintzer, and is entitled 'Die Deutschen im tropischen Amerika.' As this plain-spoken gentleman evidently expresses what many Germans feel, a few extracts from his concluding chapter

on 'Germany and the Future of Tropical America' may be in place. After repeating the stock German argument that 'the moral core of the Monroe Doctrine vanished on the day when the document concerning the annexation of the Philippines was signed by McKinley,' he goes on to say that the United States 'thereby gave us the right to confront this Greater-American doctrine with a Greater-German one—namely, that European, and among them German, interests exist also in South America, in case we have the power to assert them.' He insists upon the comparatively slight importance of the United States in South America. 'South of the Isthmus of Panama the Yankees count for little or nothing. Their trade with Central and South America has suffered a marked diminution in the last ten years. The export of corn was 18,000,000 dollars ten years ago; now (1900) it is only 8,500,000 dollars; other provisions fell from 14,000,000 dollars to less than 8,000,000; iron and steel from 17,500,000 to 16,500,000 dollars. The total drop amounted to 100,000,000 dollars. The import of South American coffee into the United States fell from

120,000,000 to 48,000,000 dollars; of sugar and molasses from 87,000,000 to 38,000,000.' Germany, he argues, needs room for her rapid growth of population (800,000 yearly), and 'cannot allow herself to be simply dispossessed of her inheritance in one of the most thinly peopled and richest quarters of the globe—South America.' 'Equality of treatment with the United States in South America, that is the theory which we, both on principle and as occasion serves, must oppose to the Monroe Doctrine, and which, too, should the moment come, we must defend by force.' He is prepared to make concessions. He admits that the outflow of population on the frontier will end by bringing Mexico within the Union, and he is prepared to extend the United States sphere of interest as far as the Panama Canal, thus giving them most of Central America, including Guatemala, which he regrets. But beyond the Canal he will concede nothing. Chile, Brazil, and the Argentine are decently governed, and capable of political alliances. In the rest of South America anarchy will bring about European intervention, 'which will not be for a few months

only,' and that intervention will be the 'signal for the political transformation of those countries, whose inhabitants must once for all abandon the dominion of their territory to another race'—which other race must be either European or North American. 'New-colonisation by a European Power' (the very thing against which Monroe aimed his message) is not obscurely indicated as the fate in store for South Brazil, and a beginning can be made in Venezuela (this was written in 1900) by picking up a harbour. But nothing can be done, and German emigration should not be directed to South America, '*unless the question whether Germany means simply to obey the American order of "Hands off!" in South America is first answered in the negative.*'

Other causes of possible alienation between Germany and the United States.

Apart from such local and temporary causes of offence as arise in connection with Germany's real or fancied encroachments upon the Monroe Doctrine, there are the large and permanent causes connected with emigration and with trade. Germany seeks to divert her emigrants from the

United States, on the one hand. The United States, on the other, naturally hold that the choice of his future home should be left to the individual emigrant, and that if he prefers the United States nothing should be done to hinder him. Francis Lieber, one of the few German-Americans who have risen to great influence in their adoptive country, and whose sympathies may be inferred from his assertion that 'a German becomes much better-looking in America, more manly and intellectual'—a statement, by the way, which Trübner, the German publisher in London, to whom it was made, capped with the reply that 'a German artist in London had made the same remark with regard to the Germans in England'—wrote in 1872: 'To possess a portion of the earth, to call a few acres his own, is a glorious feeling to one who for years has cultivated fields that belonged to others. You should see the Swedes in Minnesota, or the Germans in Missouri or Kansas, where they point to their 150 or 200 acres of land. The right to emigrate belongs to the earliest rights of the individual.' On the other hand, we have a German writer of authority

declaring that 'if a new period of emigration into the Anglo-Saxon area sets in, it will seal our fate as the inferior in the world-partitions of the future' (Halle). 'In the great conflicts of the future the German people, whose loss of millions of Germans to Anglo-Saxondom in the nineteenth century has moved the world's centre of gravity in a sense unfavourable to them, will need all inner powers of shoulders, fists, and heads, the people's power and the production-power, the fighting-power, the mind-power, and the master-power, in order to guard their rights among the peoples by land and sea' (*ibid.*). What 'shoulders' and 'fists' in favourable circumstances may mean may perhaps be gathered from the following summarised extract from a German forecast of the redistribution of the world in 1915. After a great war between the United States and a European combination, led by Germany, in which the States were invariably beaten by land and sea, and as a result of which the European Powers divided Central and South America between them, the Germans had to tackle the problem of emigration. 'The attitude of the

Germans living in the States during the great war was throughout an anti-German one. This led to the passing of an Imperial Act absolutely forbidding emigration to the States' ('Germania Triumphans').

Trade between the United States and Germany.

Trade, as conducted between Germany and the United States, may not unfairly be described as a source of permanent embitterment. 'The High Protectionism of the United States causes great exasperation in Germany, and the tendency, therefore, is to sacrifice the commercial treaties with neighbouring countries in order to have the power of putting heavy duties on American goods' (Calwer). 'The German export to America is coupled with low wages and bad conditions generally for the German operative. . . . The textile export to the United States is bought by the misery of the German workers. In 1897 Germany sent the United States textiles to the amount of 5,150,000*l.* But these goods (one-fifth of Germany's total textile export) had to be sold at much lower prices than the other four-fifths, the American duty being well over 50 per cent. Estimating the present German

textile export to the States at 5,240,000*l.*, that means that the German textiles sold there must be 50 per cent. cheaper than if they were sold to England—in other words, 2,620,000*l.* must come off. That is, every textile operative in Germany is threatened by the American Tariff with the loss of a tenth of his yearly income' (*ibid.*). There is no reason, argues another German economist, to be very solicitous about export industries 'which to the outward eye export goods, but in reality, owing to the conditions under which those goods are produced, export work-power, health, strength, and the lifeblood of the people' (Pohle).

Proposed European tariff-war with the United States.

Can anything be done? Not pretended 'sanitary' measures against American meat and cattle, which only annoy American farmers and provoke such reprisals as the differential treatment of German sugar in the Wilson Tariff (Waltershausen). Not a tariff-war of Germany against the States—for that Germany is not strong enough; but a European 'combine,' consisting firstly of the Powers of the Triple Alliance, and then of any smaller Powers, such as Holland, that can be

induced to join it, would exercise a pressure that even the States could not resist (*ibid.*). The exports from the United States to Germany for the last ten years are nearly twice the exports from Germany to the United States—339,000,000*l.* to 181,500,000*l.* Therefore the greater hazard is on the side of the United States (Calwer). Remember that 75 per cent. of the United States export is for Europe. The States, by the admission of an American Customs official, are losing in importance as a market for Europe's exports, while Europe gains importance yearly as a market for American exports. Conclusion: If Germany, better still, if a European combination, can brace its courage to a tariff-war, *the United States will not fight* (Calwer and Waltershausen).

CHAPTER IV

GERMANY AND HOLLAND

The Controversy in Holland—What would Germany gain from Customs Union?—What would Holland gain?—What Holland might lose—Other Dutch Reasons against Union—How Germany can bring Pressure to bear on Holland—The Dutch are not Germans—Dutch Language—Dutch Mission in the World—Dutch Sympathies for France—Holland and Germany are diverging.

THERE is one State which Germany dreads—Russia; two which she would like to see at odds—Britain and the United States, not to mention Britain and Russia; and yet another which she would like to absorb—Holland. There has of late been a great deal of discussion in the German press of the relations, present and future, of Germany to Holland, and the subject is important enough to Britain to call for separate treatment in these pages. My chief authorities are as follows:—

Anton, Professor at the Jena University.—'Ein Zollbündniss mit den Niederlanden,' 1902.

Bley.—'Die alldeutsche Bewegung und die Niederlande,' 1897; 'Ein Zollbündniss mit den Niederlanden,' 1902.

Francke.—In Vol. XC. of the publications of the Verein für Socialpolitik, 1900.

Grenzboten.—Three anonymous articles on 'Holland und Deutschland' in the issues for July 25, August 1, and August 8, 1901.

Halle.—'Volks- und Seewirtschaft,' 2 vols., 1902.

Heckscher.—'Eine neue Phase in den holländisch-deutschen Beziehungen,' in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* for August, 1902.

Kossmann, Privatdocent at the Leyden University.—'Holland und Deutschland, 1901.' Inaugural lecture by a German to a Dutch audience. Interesting and important on Dutch language, literature, and culture, and in general agreement with Van Houten's views.

Reismann-Grone.—'Die deutschen Reichshafen und das Zollbündniss mit den Niederlanden,' 1899.

Stubmann.—'Holland und sein deutsches Hinterland,' 1901.

Van Houten.—'Deutschland und Holland,' in the Berlin *Nation* for June 2 and 9, 1900. (A very able, temperate, and dignified argument, quite undeserving of the abusive terms applied to it by Halle.)

Waltershausen, Sartorius von, Professor at the Strasburg University.—'Ein deutschniederländischer Zollverein,' in the third volume of the *Zeitschrift für Socialpolitik,* 1901.

The obvious defect of this list is that it contains no Dutch authorities except Van Houten, though I have used the Dutch newspapers which are frequently quoted in the German discussion of the subject.[1]

The controversy in Holland.

The present discussion dates from January, 1896, the time when the German Kaiser despatched his telegram about the Jameson Raid. On its publication the Dutch *Standaard* expressed itself to the effect that in foreign affairs, if you could not bite, you should not bark. The German Empire could bite, and therefore also bark. But Holland was too weak to bite, and must therefore keep quiet and observe the strictest neutrality. To this the Utrecht *Dagblad* replied that in the present condition of the world's politics the neutrality of Holland was no guarantee of her independence. If Holland really wanted to secure her independence she must seek the protection of a greater State, which could only be the German Empire. This,

[1] In my original letter to the *Spectator* I added: 'If any reader of yours who knows Dutch could make good this deficiency, it would no doubt be useful.' The hint evoked a letter to the *Spectator* of March 21, 1903, which the writer kindly allows me to quote in its original unabbreviated form. See Note 6, p. 114.

the first suggestion of a political alliance between Holland and Germany, was favourably received in the German press. Next year (1897) the Pan-German Union came out with Fritz Bley's pamphlet on Holland, which considerably enlarged the scope of the original suggestion. Then the discussion flagged till 1899. From the autumn of that year to the summer of 1900 it ran full-tide, and the autumn of 1899 was the high-water mark for union. Since then the ebb has set in, the Dutch people finding that the policy of the telegram was not the policy of the German Government (Anton). The typical article on the German side was that of the Hague *Courant*, which advocated a Customs Union with Germany on the ground of 'greater security for our possessions, a greater field for our industry, all the advantages of a great State combined with the preservation of our independence. It seems to us that the Minister who brought about such a Customs Union would do a good piece of work for Holland.' Contradiction followed this pronouncement, but assent also. The main objection was that Holland was Free-trade, Germany Protectionist, and that such a

Union therefore was impossible. The conclusion to be drawn from the controversy in the Dutch press is that the adherents of union have gained in number and weight, but that its opponents are still in the majority (Francke).

What would Germany gain from Customs Union?

What is each country supposed to gain from such a Union? First, Germany? Germans regard it as something monstrous—an *Unding*—that the mouth of the chief German river is not in German hands, and they insist also that the Danube, which rises in Germany, should be 'wrested from the Slav world down to its mouths' (Halle). And yet no German proposes that the mouth of the Vistula should be given to Poland. The object is, firstly, to develop the Rhine traffic and the Rhine industries; secondly, to reach 'that little sea-area between the English, French, and Belgian coasts which may be regarded as the focus of the whole world's trade' (Lexis in Halle), and Holland's command of which makes her 'the best Continental sally-port (*Ausfallsthor*) against England' (Van Houten). It may be taken, however, as probable that these reasons would not by themselves suffice for the German interest in the

subject if there were no Dutch colonies. But Java and Sumatra are the tropical colonies, producing the tropical products which the Germans want, ready-made, while Curaçao and Surinam will give them the footing in the neighbourhood of the future Panama Canal of which they are hardly less desirous. One of my authorities has but recently come back from a tour in Java, and he says that 'the treasures of these wonderful islands are far from being fully worked. Scarcely a quarter per cent. of the Dutch archipelago has been surveyed for mining purposes. One gets the impression of a gigantic reserve for the capital and enterprise of future generations' (Anton). The same writer, however, who is infinitely more candid than the average German publicist, goes on to ask: 'How would the unlimited settlement of Germans in the Dutch colonies be welcome or advantageous to Holland? At present there are only twelve hundred Germans in them, to sixty thousand Dutch, in a territory about four times the size of Germany. Now the idea of filling up this vacuum by Germans naturally presents itself to Dutchmen in the light, not of a gain but of a

sacrifice, in return for German protection of their independence. And what assurance have they that that is not a fool's bargain, that the protection will not some day turn into a protectorate? Does not the history of the German Zollverein show that the economic is but a preliminary to the political union?'

What would Holland gain?

The gain for Holland is represented by these German writers as consisting first and foremost in the new great market of fifty-six million souls to which she will get access. 'That is the great and solid gain for Holland' (Anton). But is that so certain? Holland is not primarily a manufacturing country. Her lack of coal and iron prevents that (Halle and Waltershausen), and is indeed, in this age of coal and iron, the chief cause of her decline, so far as there has been decline at all. Holland's wealth is based on her colonies, her agriculture (as a stock-breeder she is far superior to Germany), her foreign investments, and, above all, her transit trade. In manufacture she will always be beaten by the Rhine industrial cities (Waltershausen). This writer enumerates as many as eleven different

advantages which Holland will derive from the Union. One is that her youth will profit by the superior educational facilities of Germany, another that she will get from Germany 'rational social legislation.' Another of my authorities admits that the whole eleven do not come to very much, and that most of them can in any case be had without going the length of a Customs Union (Anton). Again, the Union will take over the maintenance, repair, and extension of the Dutch canals and embankments, and will thus relieve Holland—especially the rural interest—from the greatest burden she has to bear (Halle). But all these considerations fade into nothing before the one great argument—the bogey of British and American aggression. Holland is told to look at the Transvaal and to consider what aspect that question would have borne if Holland had joined the German Zollverein in 1830 (Halle). In still more emphatic language she is warned that Britain and the United States are casting covetous eyes upon her colonies. 'Spain has sunk to her knees before the brutal onslaught of America, and Portugal hangs like a fly in the

spider's web, mercilessly abandoned to the monopolistic mercantile and Stock Exchange system of England' (*Grenzboten*). 'In order to escape the worst that can befall men and States, the being trodden underfoot against their will and unheard, there is but one way, and that is to join Germany' (*ibid.*). 'Holland need not go far back in her history for the loss of the Cape and Singapore, the sacrifice of Borneo, &c. Is it not good policy to link on to a powerful friend who will stretch a protecting hand over Holland's East Indian treasuries, so that hostile covetousness may not venture to touch them?' (Francke). A purely German turn is given to the argument by the assertion that 'the defence of the Dutch colonies against the aggression of colonising Great Powers is a question of life and death for the existence and the future of the German South Sea colonies. Holland can never endanger them, but every extension of another Great Power at the cost of the Dutch colonies will threaten our own colonial power in the most formidable way' (Heckscher). After all these endeavours to whip up a monster out of nothing, it is almost amusing to read the

tranquil comment of the Dutchman that 'our Free-trade system greatly strengthens our international position. The world in general would only lose if a Great Power absorbed us or our colonies. *There is no visible danger against which we might have to defend ourselves*' (Van Houten).

What Holland might lose.

Now, what are the possible disadvantages that may accrue to Holland from such a Union? In the first place, her Free-trade system would have to be sacrificed, and the High Protection of Germany adopted. On that point all these German writers without exception are agreed. Now Holland admits many necessaries, including wheat, free; the tax on other imports in no case exceeds 5 per cent. (Halle). Tobacco is hardly taxed at all (Van Houten). Compare this with the state of things in Germany, where the duty on wheat is from 20 to 30 per cent., and 50 per cent. is seriously proposed. All the necessaries of life in Holland would at one stroke become much dearer, and the only compensation suggested for the Dutch workman is that prospect of advantage for his industry from the

larger German market which I have shown to be probably fallacious. The Dutch would also be dragged into German wars, and would have to increase their taxation to pay for a larger army and navy, as well as for coast defence. They would also lose a portion of the transit trade by which, above all, they live. For this trade is not confined to Germany, as German writers sometimes pretend. 'Holland's commercial Hinterland has grown' (Stubmann), and includes not merely the whole German industrial region, but countries outside Germany. For instance, the Roumanian railways have chosen Rotterdam to be their staple-place in Western Europe, because the return freights of corn carried by their steamers are admitted free (Reismann-Grone). If they were not so admitted, Roumania would go elsewhere.

Other Dutch reasons against union.

The economic reasons against union, from the Dutch point of view, are strong; but they are not the only, perhaps not the most potent, ones. Holland is a free and democratic country, and Dutchmen hate the German official and policeman. One of the causes which influence the Dutch against union is said to be

their 'general dislike of the stiff official and military administration of Germany' (Francke). 'The great objection to Germany in Holland is the dread of the Prussian corporal spirit. It is true that there is more personal freedom in Holland. But a Customs Union would nowise affect her internal independence; and the example which Holland would give us of the superfluousness of the police and the bureaucracy in many matters in which our Governments still regard them as indispensable would be good for us' (Anton). The fact is that in sentimentalising about the Germanic origin of the Dutch the Germans forget that the Dutch have grown up in their own country to be as different a people as possible from the Germans, and that the mutual sympathies do not exist which alone could make a union desirable or fortunate.

How Germany can bring pressure to bear on Holland.

The space given by my authorities to the methods by which pressure can be brought to bear on Holland may perhaps be taken to prove that this consciousness exists at the bottom of their minds. Germany can favour Emden, Bremen, and Antwerp

by differential railway rates at the expense of the Dutch ports. The Dortmund-Ems Canal has already been constructed, but it is only a torso till it is continued to the Rhine. Then the Rhine industrial cities will have direct water communication with the German North Sea ports (Halle, Francke, &c.). 'German goods must come in and out by German ports; and if those ports are not called Rotterdam and Antwerp, they must be called Emden, Bremen, and Hamburg' (Reismann-Grone).

The Dutch are not Germans.

The popular German notion of the Dutch people is that they are Germans with a slight veneer of difference. 'The Dutch are a pure Germanic people, uncommonly near to us in blood, manners, and speech' (Reismann-Grone, who elsewhere speaks of '*the same* language'). Compare this with the verdict of a highly competent Dutchman, who speaks of the tie between Germany and Holland as one of '*distant* kinship and active intellectual and material relations' (Van Houten). As to language, Dutch is apparently nearer to English than to German. A well-known German-

Dutch language.

American writes that 'before I had learned English, books written in Dutch had now and then fallen into my hands, but I could not read them. Great, therefore, was my surprise when one day, after I had learned English pretty thoroughly, I met with a Dutch book, and found I could read it with ease. I do not mean to intimate that an Englishman who does not know German would understand Dutch as a matter of course; but my case shows in a striking manner how much nearer English is related to Dutch than German' (Francis Lieber). But the essential thing is that the Dutch conception of their mission in the world is quite different from the German one. The Germans regard the Dutch as a German fragment, which should be proud to be reabsorbed. The Dutch view may be gathered from a passage in a great German scholar's estimate of Scaliger:—'It was not to the sons of Holland only that Scaliger was a guide in scholarship. Holland, which was then in the flower of its commerce and the bloom of its freedom, fulfilled in every direction the mission which its mere geographical situation was enough to indicate—

Dutch mission in the world.

that of forming the bond of union between the Latin and the Germanic peoples' (Jacob Bernays). A Dutchman may be excused for thinking that that is a higher mission for his country than to be swallowed up in Germany.

Dutch sympathies for France.

In 1870 the sympathies of the Dutch—'against all natural feeling' (Reismann-Grone)—were for France, and when Francisque Sarcey accompanied the Comédie Française on a tour through Holland, he found the finest editions of the French classics conspicuous on the bookshelves of every household of the better class.

Answering the question whether Holland and Germany are converging or diverging, a Dutch ex-Minister replies that 'their roads so decidedly diverge, that Germany and Holland have never been politically so far apart as at this moment.' 'Present-day Holland is a new State, with new foundations. Old Holland, *qua* State, has disappeared' (Van Houten). 'At Queen Wilhelmina's coronation foreigners discovered to their surprise that the Dutch were a cheerful people. The Spaniards, Calvin, Napoleon had successively clouded their existence. But they

Holland and Germany are diverging.

were a cheerful people before the Reformation, and of late years there has been a revival of the old gay Dutch-Flemish spirit. In the second half of the nineteenth century the spirit of Goethe had expelled that of Calvin from Holland. It might be indiscreet to ask how that same Goethean spirit has fared during the same period in Germany' (*ibid.*). An old Luxemburg couplet, which one of my Pan-German authorities applies to Holland, runs as follows :—

'Mer welle bleiwe wat mer sin,
Mer welle keine Preisse sin.'

'What I now am I'll always be,
None can a "Prooshan" make of me.'

CHAPTER V

GERMANY, RUSSIA, AND THE EAST

Russia the German Nightmare—Has the Russian Colossus Feet of Clay?—Should Germany conquer Russia, what would be the Terms of Peace?—German Element shrinking on its Eastern Frontier—Germany and Asia Minor—Dangerous Convergence of Germany and Russia on the Lower Euphrates—German Views on Egypt—The Pulo Lantar Islands—China—German Repudiation of any special British Claim to the Yang-tsze—The Yellow Peril.

In my last chapter I said that there was one Power which Germany dreaded—namely, Russia—and this chapter will be devoted, in the first place, to Germany's relations with that country. By a natural transition Germany's expectations and ambitions in the Near East will follow, and the Far East will conclude the picture, to which a certain unity is given by the shadow of the Northern Colossus always looming in the background. As most of my authorities have been mentioned in previous letters, I can

dispense with a formal bibliography, only making the detailed references to my sources somewhat fuller than has hitherto seemed necessary.

Russia the German nightmare.

That Russia is the nightmare which haunts the German mind it is hardly necessary to go about to prove. We should none of us sleep better if we knew that there were some hundred thousand Cossacks encamped on the other side of our (invisible) frontier. 'Once more, as in Napoleon's day, a Great Power, this time Russia, threatens all the rest. Russia is a monstrous danger of the future. . . . The disappearance of the German Power would be a very dangerous loss for England. Have we not, both of us, nearer foes than one another? In the past the two great Germanic nations have stood side by side. We conclude that in the decisive conflicts of the future their attitude will be the same. Let us not, therefore, be irritated into antagonisms which perhaps in the great moment will not be the decisive ones' (Marcks, 'Deutschland und England,' 1900). As the contingency of an Anglo-German alliance against Russia is thus

more than hinted at, it is best to say frankly that the chief objection to it, though not the only one, from the British point of view, is that stated by the *Spectator* in its article (October 4, 1902) on 'Germany's Aspirations in regard to our Foreign Policy'—that Germany cannot and will not give us the *quid pro quo* for our Fleet. In case of a Russian attack on India, would Germany send an army across the Russian frontier? No, in no conceivable circumstances. Therefore in no conceivable circumstances can she have our Fleet. Even a secret treaty binding Germany absolutely to such a step should make no difference, for was not Bismarck the statesman who laid it down that 'no people could sacrifice its existence on the altar of fidelity to treaty, but would go only so far as suited its own interests?' ('Nauticus' in 'Flotten-Novelle').

'Either one does not think of Russia at all,' says another German writer, 'or one does so with a feeling of anxious dread of the Colossus' (Diezmann on 'Politischer Sinn bei Deutschen und Russen,' in *Preussische Jahrbücher* for March 1903). The

Has the Russian Colossus feet of clay?

well-known Russian newspaper, the *Novoe Vremya*, is quoted by another German authority (Schiemann) as declaring that 'war between Russia and Germany is a question of time only.' Only Dr. Hans Delbrück, who as a rule is by no means an easy-going optimist, takes the Colossus somewhat less seriously. After discussing signs of possible future catastrophe—economic and political—in Russia, he goes on (*Preussische Jahrbücher* for August 1902):—'Only this much can one say with certainty, that European diplomats and European financiers show lack of foresight if they leave all these signs unheeded. Political catastrophes often reach the bursting-point with astonishing rapidity and quite unexpectedly. The vital question is: Is Russia a Great Power of the future, or is she not? Scarcely anyone has doubts as to the future of Russia; European financiers even go so far as to lend her money. Do the statesmen and the financiers know what they are about?' ('Mit Recht?'—the German is magnificently brief.)

Suppose, now, that a great war between Germany and Russia does actually take place,

Should Germany conquer Russia, what would be the terms of peace?

and suppose the Germans win—the other alternative is not contemplated by my authorities—what are to be the German terms of peace? In the first place, a new great Polish State is to be formed, to serve as a buffer between Germany and Russia. The Galician and Russian Poles would be united into a new Polish kingdom. A new Ruthene State would constitute another buffer, and yet another would be provided by a Greater Roumania, which would serve to separate Russia from the Southern Slavs. Austria, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey must have war-ports on the Black Sea, and Austria must have Salonica. Russia would have to cede Finland to Sweden and Bessarabia to Austria, and a new Bessarabian State would be formed, including Odessa and the Sulina mouth of the Danube ('Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950,' by a Pan-German). This idea of a restored Poland has long been familiar to the German mind. On the Treaty of Peace concluded after the Crimea Francis Lieber wrote:—'I do not hesitate to call it an inade-

quate one; not even Poland re-established, which is, I take it, a *sine quâ non* for Europe.' As for the Danube mouths, so far back as 1844 no less a person than Moltke expressed the hope that 'Austria will guard the rights and the future of the Danube-lands, and that Germany will at length succeed in liberating the mouths of her great river.' That was the polite, old-fashioned way of putting it. The modern German version (Halle, 'Volks- und Seewirtschaft') is—'Wrest the Danube from Slavdom down to its mouths.'

German element shrinking on its Eastern frontier.

This confident tone—and neither the Pan-German of 'Grossdeutschland' nor E. von Halle is to be compared for truculence to the author of 'Germania Triumphans,' who in his reconstruction of the world's map as it will be in 1915 not only takes from Russia all that 'Grossdeutschland' takes, but carries Germany to the Dnieper and the Volga, and gives her a great crescent of Russian territory, with the Crimea as its centre—is a little surprising in view of the fact that the German element is not advancing on its eastern frontier,

but shrinking rather. 'The time for land-expansion for Germany has gone by. The German language-frontier in Europe is retreating rather than advancing' (Ehrenberg, in 'Handels- und Machtpolitik'). 'We are almost wanting in men for the Germanisation of East Germany' (Schurtz, in the *Grenzboten*). 'Germany will need all her population to dam back the Slav tide on her eastern border, and should not therefore encourage emigration to South America' (Halle). 'Prussia has made no national advance as against the Poles. The frontiers, speaking generally, are what they were in the fourteenth century. The political horizon of the German towards the East ceases with the Empire's frontier—indeed, it even finds its end when it reaches the Polish language-frontier in Prussia's own Posen' (Diezmann).

Such homely matters of fact do not, however, prevent great hopes. The most famous of German economists, Rodbertus, is frequently cited by these modern Germans on behalf of a forward policy in Turkey. In 1863 Rodbertus wrote to Lassalle: 'I hope to live to see the day when the heirship of Turkey shall

Germany and Asia Minor.

have fallen to Germany, and regiments of German soldiers or German workmen are stationed on the Bosphorus.' Ever since the days of Ross and Fallmerayer Germans have fancied that they saw a field for German colonisation, and perhaps for German sovereignty, in Asia Minor. The Anatolian Railway, already carried by German capital and German engineering as far as Konia, and to be carried, if circumstances permit, to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf, has naturally strengthened such ideas. The German hope has always been that the railway would be attended or followed by the settlement of German colonists along the route. But the Porte has set its face against any such scheme, and nothing has been done in that sense as yet. From the political point of view, the next sections of the line will be the important ones. Russia, encamped in the highlands about the sources of the Euphrates, regards it as her mission to drop some day from the mountain to the plain, to Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. The Russians coming from the North and the Germans coming from the West will some

Dangerous convergence of Germany and Russia on the Lower Euphrates.

day meet. The ancient Greek oracle told Crœsus, coming like the Germans from the West, that when he had crossed the Halys he would destroy a great Empire. The Halys is the river which may be regarded as constituting a possible rough division of Asia Minor into an eastern and a western sphere. It is this eastern sphere on which the Germans are now about to enter. When Crœsus, defeated, ruined, and saved only by a hair's-breadth from a miserable death, complained of the falsehood of the oracle, the reply of that venerable but wide-awake institution was that it had said that Crœsus would destroy an empire, but it had not said which empire. *Absit omen!*

German views on Egypt.

The next stage on the eastward journey is Egypt, the references to which in my German authorities contain no recognition of Britain's work in organising the administration and the finances, but only see in our occupation a means of bringing pressure to bear upon us at a convenient moment. Schiemann, the Berlin Professor, observes that Germany can make Britain's position in Egypt untenable by

joining France and Russia. 'Grossdeutschland' would like to see France and Germany reconciled, 'of course at the expense of others,' and would square France with Egypt. 'Germania Triumphans' would also turn us out of Egypt, but would put back Turkey in our place. Imagine the state of mind of an educated European who seriously proposes to replace the Turkish yoke on a people which had escaped from it! That Germany would reap any advantage, economic or political, from such a policy does not appear.

The Pulo Lantar islands.

Before passing on to, and concluding with, China, brief reference must be made to some mysterious scheme, of which I find hints in more than one of my authorities, for a German occupation of the Pulo Lantar group of islands off the Malay Peninsula. The chief authority is Dix ('Deutschland auf den Hochstrassen des Weltwirtschaftsverkehrs,' 1901), who informs his readers that one of the Malay Rajahs owns an island group, containing a bay of sufficient depth and extent to shelter even the greatest steamships, and protected against the south-west monsoon. 'This group, called Pulo

Lantar, had been wholly overlooked until a retired German naval officer, Captain Rust, discovered its possibilities *qua* harbour and *qua* plantation-colony. It is also a great place for tin. Unfortunately, the scheme was prematurely made public owing to a private colonial quarrel, and thereby, it may be conjectured, a satisfactory solution for ever made impossible. . . . The scheme must be regarded as shipwrecked in the moment of its publication.' What exactly it all means is far from clear; but no doubt the Governor of the Straits Settlements knows all about it.

China.

A few last words on China. Hermann Schumacher, now Professor at the University of Kiel, and formerly, it would seem, either consul or merchant at Hong-kong, has an important article on 'Germany's Interests in China' in the second volume of 'Handels- und Machtpolitik.' He gives a picture of Hong-kong's humble and difficult beginnings, and contrasts it with the present. He waxes boastful on the distinguished place occupied by Germans in the business life of Hong-kong, but has no word in recognition of the British liberality,

which alone has made that possible, or of the fact that these Germans are but late comers to the feast spread by the labours of Britons in the early years of struggle against overwhelming difficulties. He mentions the friendly attitude of Britain towards Germany as regards Shantung, but has no word for that either. On the other hand, he tells his countrymen that Britain's game in China is to control other branches of the Administration as she controls the Customs, and, above all, to keep the Customs permanently in her hands—*i.e.*, after Sir Robert Hart's death or resignation. It is an international interest, he says, to thwart that game. He admits that there are double as many British firms as German at Shanghai, and yet Dix expresses the general German opinion when he says that Germany will not recognise a British Yangtsze sphere, but will, on the contrary, if China breaks up, seize a large slice of the Yangtsze region for herself. As the theory of spheres is altogether unsound, and as the 'open door' is the policy for which we have to work, and if need be even fight, that need

German repudiation of any special British claim to the Yangtsze.

not greatly trouble us. It is satisfactory to find that Schumacher is strong in his conviction that China is wholly indigestible, and therefore non-annexable, by Europe.

The Yellow Peril.

Is the 'Yellow Peril' serious? In the seventh volume of Helmolt's new German history of the world, now being published (Heinemann) in an English translation, I find these words:—'When South-Eastern Asia, which numbers seven hundred to eight hundred million tractable, frugal inhabitants, has completely adopted the material civilisation of Western Europe, then the industries of the smaller continent must yield to them. . . . If ever the foreign countries which are still half-grown refuse to Europe the tribute of trading profits because they have become grown-up, independent, and competent rivals, Europe will have to look for her salvation to warlike and political forces. . . . As Goethe says, "The law is mighty, but necessity is mightier."' So much for the German Professor at his desk. Schumacher, who has actually seen both China and Japan, takes quite a different view. Only the simpler branches of industry, in

which a settled technique has been attained, with machines requiring little repair or adaptation, and in which the division of labour has been carried but a little way—such industries as wool and cotton spinning—will suit the Chinese. And even with regard to those industries it is a significant fact that in 1898 the Shanghai cotton-spinning mills had only sixty to seventy per cent. of their spindles going, while of the twenty-five silk-spinning factories no fewer than fourteen had stopped work entirely. 'But where, as in most branches of modern industry on a great scale, a subtle interaction of many parts is needful, where the machines require constant repair, where equality in international competition cannot be attained by the learning of manual dexterities once for all, but demands the continuous intellectual development and completion of technical science and apparatus, there the danger of an effective great-scale competition of these races shrinks to almost nothing.' So much for the Yellow bogey. Needless to say that the great majority of those who really know China agree with Dr. Schumacher.

CHAPTER VI

GERMANY AND BRITAIN ONCE MORE

The Pan-Germanic Literature—Germans on Germany—Germans on Britain—The British Fleet—Livonius's Unfavourable View—Invasion possible—Another German View, Invasion impossible—The Moral, Britain and the United States should hold together.

In this concluding chapter I propose to illustrate by quotation, first, the German view of Germany; second, the German view of Britain and the British Empire; third, the German view of the British fleet; and fourth, the possibilities of invasion as they present themselves to the German mind.

The Pan-Germanic literature.

The literature from which I am about to quote is not, as a rule, of a particularly high type. It may be called a 'Battle of Dorking' literature, inverted. That is, its warnings are addressed, not to Germans, as the

English author of 'The Battle of Dorking' addressed his to his fellow-countrymen, but to Englishmen. For Germans there are, with rare exceptions, no warnings, but war-whoops only. It is the most presumptuous and Nemesis-provoking literature ever evolved by any people at any time, and some of its productions might be considered absolutely insane, if Madame de Staël had not taught us that 'thinking calms men of other nations; it inflames the German;' and if Nietzsche had not prepared us for some strange phenomena when he prophesied that 'the German Empire will destroy the German mind.' My chief authorities (over and above those mentioned in previous chapters) for the four topics I have named are as follows :—

Amran, L. von.—'Englands Land- und Seepolitik,' 1902.

Bley.—'Weltstellung des Deutschthums,' 1897.

Delbrück on Germany and England, in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* for March, 1903.

Eisenhart, Dr. Karl.—'Die Abrechnung mit England,' 1900. (Four editions in the first year of publication. 'Eisenhart' is possibly a pseudonym.

'Germania Triumphans.'—'Rückblick auf die welt-

geschichtlichen Ereignisse der Jahre 1900–1915, von einem Grösstdeutschen, 1895.

'Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1850,' von einem Alldeutschen, 1895.

H., Captain, in *Marine Rundschau* for June, 1902.

Livonius.—'Die deutsche Nordseeflotte und die Englische Seemacht,' in *Deutsche Revue* for February, 1902.

Moulin-Eckart.—'Englands Politik und die Mächte,' 1901.

'*Nauticus.*'—'Year-book of German Maritime Interests.'

Ratzel.—'Das Meer als Quelle der Völkergrösse,' 1900.

Germans on Germany.

To begin with the German view of Germany. 'Beyond all question the German people now holds the first place in arts and sciences' (Hasse, 'Deutsche Weltpolitik'). 'German trade has unhorsed England almost everywhere' (Funke, 'Deutsche Siedlung über See'). 'We are undoubtedly the best warrior-people in the world' (Bley, 'Weltstellung des Deutschthums'). 'We are the most accomplished people in all domains of science and fine art' (*ibid.*) 'We are the best settlers, the best seamen, even the best merchants' (*ibid.*) 'The modern world owes to us Germans pretty well everything in the way of great achievements that it has to show'

(*ibid.*). 'Ours is the future, for we are the young' (*ibid.*). 'German industry, in its chief productions, now holds the first place in the world. . . . In German industry a good bit of idealism, a quantity of individual pleasure in the creative effort, is worked in. This impulse of the soul, no less than mere technique, it is which will secure to our industry precedence over all competitors for an indefinite period to come' (*Grenzboten* article on Holland). Herwegh's 'fiery soul' thus delivers itself on Germany's mission to the world:—'Thou art the shepherd of the great nation-flocks. Thou art the great people of the future on this earth. Up, then, with the anchor!' Of course the nautical shepherd cannot tolerate any claim to equality with himself from the sheep whom it is his business to rule and, if they are good, to 'civilise;' and in the Greater Germany of the future Magyars, Poles, Czechs, and Slavs in general will be unable to vote or to hold land, but will be found useful in the 'inferior manual occupations' ('Grossdeutschland'). Quite in the tone of the transformed Malvolio finding work for Sir Andrew Aguecheek and Sir Toby Belch!

Exaltation of oneself is wont to be accompanied by detraction of other people, and Germany is no exception to the rule. Britain is the foil whose wickedness and weakness show up Germany's greatness and virtue. There are a few Englishmen (probably not readers of German newspapers) who seriously maintain that the German press campaign against our army in South Africa was the disinterested criticism of a fair outsider. To them I commend the passage in which Dr. Hans Delbrück, one of the ablest and most candid of German publicists, after claiming for the support given to the Boer cause by the German people that it was 'natural and justified,' goes on to tell his countrymen in plain terms that 'the insults with which the English army and the English national character were at that time bespattered, not in the German press only, but in the Reichstag, were, however, so excessively gross that one could scarcely take it amiss if the English bore a grudge against us for them.' But as I have said before, the Transvaal war may have been the occasion for this special outburst of German malevolence; it was certainly

Germans on Britain.

not the cause. Here is one of the flowers of rhetoric which drop at every moment from the pen of a Pan-German. If Holland and Germany had not been sundered, 'Germany would have rejuvenated and inspired the wide world with her noble life-blood in the last three centuries, instead of it having been desolated by the Britons' (Bley, 'Machtstellung Deutschlands'). 'Britain has shown herself a far more systematic and persistent enemy to Germany than all Huns, Frenchmen, and Imperial Pandours put together; yea, worse even than the plague. For the plague carries off one generation only; but Britain has hounded on the pack against the German people over and over again, whenever we tried to recover and take breath' (*ibid.*). The same writer denounces 'Britain's policy of entangling us all in Continental wars, and so preventing our development overseas,' and indeed this accusation of exploiting, inflaming, and even creating, Continental differences in the interest of our commercial and colonial policy is one of the commonest charges against Britain in the German mouth. Even a serious Professor like Sering (in 'Handels- und

Machtpolitik') endorses and repeats it. Moulin-Eckart (also a Professor—at Munich) is eloquent on the 'brutal and cunning tactics of the British merchant,' 'the greedy but steady gaze of the beast of prey, turned by Britain upon Algeria' (*sic*), and the 'piratical system' pursued by Britain against Holland (who gave as good as she got, and who has an Amboyna massacre, which even Ernst von Halle admits, with unconscious humour, was 'not to be justified on principles of international law,' to her account). At the time of the Crimean war, according to Moulin-Eckart, Britain 'laid a net' for Prussia, which Prussia was clever enough to escape. In 1870, he continues, Britain could have prevented war if she had told France she would not have it. (How that would have suited the views of the editor of the Ems despatch does not appear.) Finally, this authority finds the grievance of grievances in the British reception of the Emperor's telegram to Kruger. 'Our Emperor knows that an insult to him is an insult to the nation, and that the day of atonement will come; for God's mills grind slow but sure. And he may

have thought to himself amid the turmoil—"Be quiet, my sword, thy day will come!"' To Eisenhart, on the other hand, the supreme grievance is Samoa. The attitude of the German Government he characterises as 'backboneless submissiveness' to Britain and the United States, and he tells us that 'by their treatment of that question the Anglo-Saxon brethren have made an irreconcilable enemy of the greatest and strongest military Power in the world. . . . Germany had to wait two hundred years until it could avenge the robbery of Strasburg. Why should it not wait another two centuries for revenge on the outrage of Samoa?'

The British fleet.

With menaces so dire impending over our devoted heads, it may be as well perhaps to ask, What of the Fleet? And here I find my authorities at variance, one group maintaining that the British naval officers and men are as good as the ships, another that our *personnel* is decidedly inferior to the German one. In his 'Year-book of German Maritime Interests 'Nauticus' quotes the *Marine Rundschau*, which may be supposed to represent the average

technical point of view, as asserting that the British naval *personnel* is 'a model,' and declares on his own account that we are easily first in the important matter of coaling. 'The two-Power standard has been maintained, and the German press has been misled by the English Navy League into thinking that the English fleet is not as good as it ever was.' Amran argues that the vital positions—Gibraltar, Skager Rack, the Kattegat—are so favourable to Britain, and unfavourable to the Continent, that to meet her with success at sea the latter would need to have four or five times as many ships. Without cables, coaling-stations, and unity in command, two thousand five hundred or three thousand fighting units would be no match for the British thirteen hundred.

Livonius' unfavourable view.

The principal spokesman of the other side is Admiral Livonius, who, in an article in the *Deutsche Revue*, maintains that the British fleet has found its Capua in the Mediterranean. 'I proceed to this inquiry,' he says, 'with a certain reluctant aversion, with a kind of pious awe. The British seaman has

always been my model of excellence in seamanship, the exploits and the victories of the great British sea-heroes have excited my seaman's enthusiasm from my earliest youth.' He believes, however, that circumstances have taken a turn unfavourable to Britain, as compared with her great period. Britain now relies on the number of her ships. But when she won her great naval victories at the beginning of the century, her fleet was numerically inferior. At Trafalgar she had twenty-seven ships of the line; the French and Spaniards, thirty-three. At the battle of Cape St. Vincent there were only fifteen British ships to thirty-three Spanish. Britain owed her victories to (1) the superiority of her captains and admirals—St. Vincent, which was won by Jervis, was 'one of the grandest and most brilliant naval battles of all history'—and (2) the intensive training of the *personnel*, the continual practice in tactical manœuvres. The blockade of the French coast-towns, kept up in all weathers (some of my readers will remember Alfred de Vigny's wonderful picture of that grand sea-dog, Collingwood, renouncing home and family, and all that made

life pleasant, in order to keep fast that iron grip on Brest), did much to perfect this training, and the French had nothing similar. But now—(1) There is no reason to expect commanders of like quality. Look at Tryon and the admiral who obeyed the fatal order. Here are no proofs of mastery, independence, and decision. (2) The British training is inferior to the German. Winter and summer, the German ships are training in the most dangerous seas. 'How different now in Britain! The Mediterranean is no true training-ground for seamen' (*ibid.*). Even the seafaring Phœnicians of old got their training, not there, but in the Indian Ocean (Ratzel). 'Of tactical evolutions,' continues Livonius, 'there is hardly question. At Singapore the commander of the British ironclad "Swiftsure" was quite amazed at the celerity with which the night-watch on my ship obeyed the unexpected order to clear decks for action. *He* could not trust his men to tumble out of bed in that way. Here, again, we have the difference between military duty and mercenary service.' (Needless to say, I leave the exclusive responsibility for the state-

ment about the 'Swiftsure' to Admiral Livonius.) The annual British manœuvres are useless, not to be compared to a rational continuous training. (No such training in the British fleet?) The old British tactical and seamanlike superiority is gone. '*We can unhesitatingly claim it for ourselves.*' Ships do not fight, but men, and to multiply ships without the men is futile. The conclusion of Admiral Livonius is that the invasion of Britain has become quite possible with steam.

Invasion possible.

The opposite view is powerfully expounded in a remarkable article by Captain H. in the *Marine Rundschau* for June, 1902. History proves, says this writer, that the landing of troops in a hostile country, which can be reached by water only, presupposes absolute mastery of the sea. Napoleon, it is true, landed in Egypt without having first obtained such mastery, but the expedition ran counter to the simplest laws of strategy (Admiral Colomb is here referred to), and in the end failed lamentably. Again, Britain landed thirty thousand men in the Crimea without having first

Another German view, invasion impossible.

secured the safety of the transports by the annihilation or blockade of the Russian Fleet, but only the Russian indecision made that possible. As for the idea of a surprise attack, in these days of telegraphs and swarms of fast British cruisers that is a pure chimera. No such expedition could be undertaken without casting its shadow over the whole earth for weeks beforehand. Then, the transports carrying the invading force could not get up an average pace of more than twelve knots; the British cruisers and torpedo-destroyers would be infinitely faster. It follows that there must be a successful naval battle first. But after such a battle the invading fleet, even if victorious, would be crippled, and the repairs would take months. Moreover, the speed and freedom of movement of modern warships would make it possible even for a weaker force to get at the transports. Without sea-mastery of a very real kind, therefore, invasion is altogether too dangerous; and under modern conditions such absolute sea-mastery is far more difficult of attainment than it was. The conclusion is that *in a question of invasion*

modern conditions are all on the side of the defensive.

Still, let us suppose that the British coast is reached. One hundred thousand men would be needed for any prospect of success. The British landed thirty thousand men in eleven hours in the Crimea; but the men had nothing but their knapsacks, the weather was splendid, and the force was not ready to march or fight before three days had passed. The landing of the men only is naught without artillery, horses, and transport. This would take days, and if the weather were bad, the case would be still worse. Then there is the resistance by land. Imagine rifle-fire on the crammed boats and lighters. Even if the British army be as bad as people say (which Captain H. clearly doubts), the resistance of a people of forty millions counts. In 1870, after France's standing army had been all destroyed or nullified, Gambetta called three armies into existence, totalling four hundred thousand men, and much fighting had to be done. There were a million German soldiers on French soil, and all communications were in their hands. Lastly, there would be the difficulty

of feeding the invaders in a country which does not grow its own corn. The invading force would have to subdivide, and its risks would grow. However regarded, the facts lead to the conclusion that *under the present conditions invasion is not possible.* 'Those who in blind undervaluing of England impose upon our Fleet aims beyond its strength are guilty of a grievous error. The adverse judgments on England's sea-power passed by part of our daily, and even of our military, press will not be endorsed by any one who knows the strength and excellence of her ships, the efficiency of her officers and men, the value of her sea-bases, and—who has read England's naval history.'

The moral, Britain and the United States should hold together.

One last word. Two of the Pan-German prophets of the future, 'Germania Triumphans' and Dr. Eisenhart, represent Germany as fighting against both Britain and the United States, but fighting against them separately. In 'Germania Triumphans' the United States are first attacked and defeated by both sea and land and Britain is represented as chuckle-headed enough and base enough to look on and do nothing. Then comes Britain's turn. The only difference in Dr.

Eisenhart's vaticination of the future is that Germany takes Britain first, and the United States look on. Britain is disposed of, 'and now,' says the prophet, 'it was time to reckon with America.' Not even these half-sane Pan-Germans contemplate the possibility of dealing with Britain and the United States *together*. The lesson is a good one, and if I were asked to indicate in a sentence the supreme moral of these chapters, it would be just that,—friendship, and, if need be, mutual aid, between the great twin brethren of Anglo-Saxondom.

APPENDIX

Note 1, Page 4.

As accusations of this gross and absurd kind are common in the German press, I am glad to be able to quote the following from a French source. The German responsibility for Turkish recalcitrance is serious and terrible. The Paris correspondent of the *Times* writes (April 2, 1903) :—

'The French press having been accused by certain of their German contemporaries of having contributed to promote the pending agitation in South-Eastern Europe, a correspondent of the *Siècle*, who apparently knows what he is writing about, makes the following trenchant retort :

"What has hitherto been the most efficacious support of the Sultan and of his unspeakable *régime*? Who has encouraged, and still encourages, him in his uncompromising attitude? Which Power up to the present has most benefited by his recklessness and extravagance? Did not Prince Bismarck in 1884 secretly send to Constantinople a confidential agent to induce Abdul Hamid to arm against Russia and to procure armaments in Germany? If the fact is denied, the name of the delegate can be given, as also details

of his negotiations. Did not Radovitz, in a memorable document, remind the Sultan of a superannuated treaty of alliance between Turkey and Prussia negotiated during the reign of Abdul Hamid I., and did he not insist upon its coming into force again, so that Turkey might be drawn within the sphere of the Triple Alliance? How then? Is the German press, obeying a *mot d'ordre* from above, entitled to side openly with despotism and tyranny, while the French newspapers are not permitted to defend justice and humanity? In the midst of the Armenian, or rather the Christian, tragedy the Emperor William thought proper to go to Constantinople and embrace his friend the Khalif, and in the very midst of the Macedonian crisis he sends his heir to do homage at Yildiz Kiosk, while the German press accuses others of seeking to disturb the peace of Europe. No, French public opinion is not responsible for the blood that has been shed in the East, nor for that which, alas! may still be shed there. If, as is unfortunately probable, and indeed almost certain, the plan of reforms for Macedonia should fall through, the healthy and impartial element of public opinion in the civilised world will attribute the responsibility partly to Germany. As regards more especially German policy in the East, it has been rather clumsy. Its inspirers forget that in order to secure work for the German factories, in order to get German officials paid and to procure business for German commercial travellers, the Christian populations, who are the only ones who work and produce anything, must enjoy some degree of justice and perfect tranquillity. It is a well-known fact that the Turk is neither a merchant

nor a manufacturer, nor yet a financier. Indeed, he is scarcely any longer a tiller of the soil, in consequence of his military obligations. Germany, by allowing the Christian populations to be annihilated, will some day perceive that she has deliberately tolerated the destruction of the source of her revenues. Unfortunately it will then be too late.' The correspondent of the 'Times' adds :—

'It may be going too far to hold Germany's policy in the Balkan Peninsula responsible to any considerable extent for the present state of affairs in Turkey. Nevertheless, it has been within my knowledge for at least the last twelve months that in more than one of the European Chancelleries concern has been felt at the increasing infatuation of the Sultan due to the ostentatious patronage of Germany.'

NOTE 2, PAGE 4.

The following correspondence on this reference to Professor Delbrück appeared in the *Spectator* of December 27, 1902, and January 3, 1903 :—

SIR,—May I, one of Professor Delbrück's pupils, be allowed a few lines in reference to the letter appearing over the signature 'Vigilans sed Æquus' in the *Spectator* of December 20? It would obviously be improper for a matriculated student to criticise his professors in a foreign journal. I therefore refrain from saying anything of Professors Schmoller and Schiemann; but your correspondent's letter might

give the impression that Professor Delbrück is one of the German England-haters. I have been his pupil for more than two years, and I can assure you that in his large heart there is no room for hate, except hatred of humbug and untruth. On more than one occasion have I heard him warn a class of some two hundred students against lending credence to the calumnies of the German press in reference to English 'brutality' in South Africa. To call Professor Delbrück Anglophil would be as untrue as to attribute to him a senseless and small-minded hatred of England; but in his lofty and fascinating character love of truth and the courage with which he ever bears witness to the truth are most strikingly apparent.—I am, Sir, &c.,

J. D. Drummond.

Berlinerstrasse 116, Charlottenburg.

Sir,—Your correspondent, Mr. J. D. Drummond, writing from a suburb of Berlin, in the *Spectator* of December 27, takes exception to my letter on 'Germany and Britain' in your issue of December 20 on the ground that it 'might give the impression that Professor Delbrück is one of the German England-haters.' I said nothing about Professor Delbrück being an England-hater. What I said was that such a man as Professor Delbrück, 'compared to the ordinary German journalist, as Hyperion to a Satyr,' had repeated an ignoble slander against our troops on no better ground than that it had not been contradicted. The whole point of my reference to Professor Delbrück was that he was not the ordinary German Anglophobe. He is a man who for character and ability may be

compared to Mr. Bryce or Mr. Morley among ourselves. What, therefore, may we infer as to average German feeling towards England if even such a man makes himself responsible for the diffusion of that story on that evidence? As my reference to Professor Delbrück has been challenged, I proceed to quote exactly what he said, and am the readier to do so as my reference to the back numbers of the *Preussische Jahrbücher* (of which Professor Delbrück is editor) has revealed the fact that, though he repeated the slander in December, 1901, he recanted it in February, 1902. I had overlooked the latter passage, and am very glad to do Professor Delbrück the justice of quoting it. In the first article (p. 562) Professor Delbrück wrote:—'The statement is still uncontradicted, that on two different occasions English soldiers, when attacked, put captive Boer women in front of them and, so protected, fired.' In the second article (p. 387) we have the recantation:—'Another charge, which I myself repeated in these pages, I now see myself compelled to withdraw. Herr Schowalter, who represents the Boer cause in Germany with energy and eloquence, has put together the evidence for that outrage in the *Tägliche Rundschau*. I have carefully examined his compilation, but have come to the conclusion that, by all the rules of historical criticism, he fails to prove his case.' Professor Delbrück concludes that the story is one of the ordinary war-legends, and even invents a theory to account for its origin. I am glad to have this opportunity of quoting the recantation, as I had previously quoted the slander. Still, my original argument holds good. Professor

Delbrück may fairly be compared to Mr. Bryce or Mr. Morley. Is it conceivable that Mr. Bryce or Mr. Morley would give the authority of his name, and the publicity of a great English review, to a similar charge against the German army on no other ground (itself probably a mere mis-statement) than that the story had not been contradicted?—I am, Sir, &c.,

VIGILANS SED ÆQUUS.

NOTE 3, PAGE 11.

This question of a British Zollverein is so important, and its introduction would, I cannot but think, be so fatal to our interests, that I am glad to be able to quote this utterance of an Australian statesman from the papers of April 9, 1903:—

'Sir William M'Millan, formerly Colonial Treasurer of New South Wales, and now a member of the Australian Federal Parliament, addressed a meeting in London on Tuesday of members of the Australian Chamber of Commerce on "preferential trade and other matters affecting Imperial interests." He said it was important to keep in mind—what some people seemed unable to do—that the three great federations of the future were in different parts of the world, and existed under entirely different conditions. What might suit Canada might not suit Australia. What might suit South Africa might suit neither of the others. It was clear, therefore, that any political bond of union must be of the most elastic kind. It was with some reluctance that he differentiated

Australia from other parts of the Empire, but it was necessary to do so. The Australians were a Western people with an Eastern destiny. Important as the British connection was to them from a trade point of view, they must pause before putting at defiance the commercial world outside the British Empire. At present Australia had a foreign trade that was increasing by leaps and bounds, and it was a matter of vital importance that they should do nothing to interfere with it. He differed on this question from Mr. Chamberlain, who might well be called the greatest Colonial Minister England ever had. While he did not desire to speak in a dogmatic tone, he held the view very strongly that the day England gave up her Free-trade policy would see the beginning of her decline. Going into the statistics of the question from the Australian point of view, he said that in 1891 Australian imports were worth forty millions, of which 60 per cent. were from the United Kingdom. The exports were worth forty-eight millions, and of these 52 per cent. went to the United Kingdom. Nearly one half of the total trade of Australia was with countries other than the United Kingdom, and, while its trade with the United Kingdom had increased two and a half times since 1861, its trade with foreign countries had increased seven times. His general conclusion was that it would be good neither for Britain nor for Australia to do anything that would interfere with their trade with the rest of the world.'

An excellent exposure of the futility and mischievousness of the whole idea, from the point of view of a scientific Free-trader who has not lost his

faith in Britain's power to hold her own without hiding behind a wall of duties, which could only conduce in the long run to the advantage of her rivals, will be found in Dr. Paul Arndt's 'Handelsbeziehungen Deutschlands zu England und den englischen Kolonien,' 1899.

Note 4, Page 16.

The following is the letter from Mrs. D'Arcy Collyer, referred to on p. 16:—

To the Editor of the 'Spectator.'

Sir,—'Vigilans sed Æquus,' in his important summary of the causes of enmity between Germany and Great Britain in your issue of December 20, dates their origin so far back as the Seven Years' War, on which occasion, he declares, the Russian grievance against England was a real one; and he quotes a still stronger statement from the 'Times,' in which the reviewer of Mr. George Peel's book, 'The Enemies of England,' speaks of Lord Bute's abandonment of Frederick the Great (the alleged grievance) as worse than an abandonment—rather it was a betrayal, a betrayal by the Prime Minister of England of the plans of his ally, the King of Prussia, to their common enemy, the Duc de Choiseul. The 'Times' reviewer adds that the subject has never been properly dealt with by English historians; and it is this which emboldens me to point out that in a recent volume of the Royal Historical Society, 'The Buckinghamshire Correspondence,' the whole case on both sides may be studied in two long Memorials, the one compiled under

the direction of Frederick, the other containing the reply of the English Government. The documents are there ready to the hand of the historian. With the Memorials are copies of the correspondence which passed between the two Governments at the time, as well as some corroborative evidence culled from the MS. correspondence of Sir Andrew Mitchell and from that of the Earl of Buckinghamshire himself, to whom the whole collection was transmitted during the first year of his Embassy to St. Petersburg in order that he might clear the English Government of the monstrous charges which Frederick had brought against them, and with which he hoped to poison the mind of the Czar and his Ministers at a time when England was anxious to obtain the alliance of Russia as a counterbalance to the dreaded power of France. The whole question is an intricate one, and not the less so from the intricacies of Frederick's own tortuous diplomacy. It is naturally impossible to go into details here; but unless other evidence is forthcoming, it is incredible that English people, subject as they are to that curious indolence and false pride which make them content to pass unchallenged the most infamous accusations, should still permit it to be said that a Prime Minister of England deliberately betrayed her ally to his enemy. In brief, the accusations of Frederick were:—

(1) That the Government of Lord Bute had concluded a separate peace with France without due regard to the interests of Prussia.

(2) That it had secretly approached the Court of Vienna with an offer to guarantee Silesia to Austria if she would retire from the struggle.

(3) That it had attempted to deter Peter III. from his treaty of peace with Prussia, on the ground that the alliance would make Frederick too extravagant in his demands.

On these and other points the Memorials are diffuse; but it may not be amiss to point out here that in regard to the first, Sir Andrew Mitchell at Frederick's instigation had written to his Government (January 16, 1760) that if England could not find some means of detaching France from the Coalition, Frederick must be irretrievably lost, and that by the peace concluded in 1762 between England and France that object was attained. On the second point the testimony of George Grenville should be conclusive:—

'Towards the close of the war,' he writes to Lord Buckinghamshire (Brit. Museum Add. MS. 22358), 'in order to try to draw the Empress Queen from her close alliance with France, an inquiry was obliquely made how far she might be disposed to accept of an indemnification in *Italy and the Low Countries*. This his Prussian Majesty thought proper to resent, though it would be difficult for him to prove how far that resentment was founded.'

On the third point Lord Buckinghamshire obtained a disclaimer from the Russian Government in which it was pointed out that the late Emperor (Peter III.) had from his excessive partiality for Frederick misinterpreted some expressions of the English Minister as prejudicial to his interests, and that a bad translation had further caused him to misapprehend the despatches from England (see vol. i. p. 194). Your correspondent, 'Vigilans sed Æquus,' admits that on this thorny

subject evidence in favour of the English point of view has been supplied by a German writer. To this I may add that another well-known German writer, Albert von Ruville, has contributed a pamphlet to the controversy in which he points out in detail the inconsistencies of Frederick's charges against the character of Bute. In my preface to the Buckinghamshire Papers I have endeavoured to set forth these points to the best of my ability. It remains for a more competent historian to awaken the world to their truth. Meantime, in face of the fact that Lord Bute, whose personal honour has not been impugned, has categorically denied the truth of the charges brought against him, it seems to me imperatively incumbent upon any writer who repeats the shameful accusation against the honour of the English Government to *produce his evidence*.—I am, Sir, etc.,

ADELAIDE D'ARCY COLLYER.

[The following comment on the above appeared as a postscript to the second letter :—

'I was very glad to see Mrs. D'Arcy Collyer's letter in your issue for January 31, in defence of Bute against the *Times* charges. She takes me to task, but my only offence was in assuming as self-evident that the *Times* would not print a statement impugning not merely Bute's, but the nation's, honour without absolute certainty of its correctness. I have been convinced by her letter, still more by the German essay to which she refers (Ruville, "William Pitt und Graf Bute," 1895), that in his attempt to ruin Bute, Frederick, not otherwise a scrupulous person, stuck at nothing, and

that none of his charges against the English Minister should be accepted without the strongest possible external evidence.'—VIGILANS SED ÆQUUS.

NOTE 5, PAGE 19.

The reference here was chiefly to the following letter, which appeared in the *Spectator* of December 6, 1902:—

PATRIOTIC PARALYSIS IN GERMANY

To the Editor of the 'Spectator.'

SIR,—I find this very excellent phrase in the letter of 'An Englishman,' writing from Shanghai, in the *Spectator* of November 15. He illustrates from Haeckel 'the extent to which patriotic paralysis has permeated intellectual Germany.' Germans have become so used to a flattering mirror for themselves, and an unflattering mirror for other people, that they have altogether ceased to see themselves as they really are. Perhaps they were too diffident at first (Englishmen who knew Germany well fifty years ago have been heard to declare, of course with a conscious touch of extravagance, that at the bottom of his heart no German then really thought himself the equal of an Englishman), and their writers consequently thought it necessary to flatter their self-esteem. But whatever the cause, the result has been unfortunate; Germans are perpetually laying claim to virtues and achievements which they have not made and do not possess. It would be easy to quote scores of German writers, some of them eminent, who have the hardi-

hood to claim Gothic architecture for Germany. 'Gothic, in other words, German, architecture,' says Geiger, the biographer of Goethe, and an excellent scholar in his line. Now, is it conceivable that he should not know that Gothic architecture originated in the Ile de France, and that the greatest Gothic churches are in that district or near it? Plenty of German writers on architecture have stated the truth quite frankly, though even they often try to wriggle out of the conclusion. Thus Kraus, the great historian of Christian art, quite admits what I have been saying, but seeks to neutralise its effect by the contention that the Ile de France was not French, but Frankish, and therefore Teutonic, and therefore German, as the usual thimblerigging process goes on. As if the whole point were not that a Teutonic germ, coming in contact with a Romano-Celtic seed-bed, set up the intellectual ferment which made a great art possible. It is just the same with Shakespeare, who is Teuton on one side of him no doubt, but who would never have been Shakespeare if the 'Teutonic paste in his composition' had not been raised to a higher power by something more fiery and volatile. The way the patriotic paralysis lets itself loose on Shakespeare would be nauseating if it were not a little touching:—

> Milton deucht mir der Briten Poët, der gewaltige Shakespeare
> Ist der germanischen Welt eigen wohin sie sich dehnt.

So writes Geibel, a well-known poet. He is good enough to allow us the exclusive possession of Milton, but Shakespeare belongs to the Germanic world wherever it extends. As if Shakespeare were not the

most English of all conceivable Englishmen! Of course, in a sense Shakespeare is for all mankind, and perhaps rather for the Teutonic portion of it than for the Latin. But that is not the way the Germans take it. It is easy to substitute 'German' for 'Germanic' (*Deutsche* for *Germane*), and hey presto! Shakespeare becomes not merely a Germanic but a German glory. Thus we are told of the late Hermann Grimm, perhaps the best-known among modern German critics, that he picked out, 'not without a feeling of national pride,' the five greatest poets of the world—David, Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe—and congratulated himself that two of them were Teutons (*Germanen*). The writer (R. Steig) goes on:—'Grimm believed in the world-mission of the German people.' Now there may be room for ethnic, Indo-European pride in a German for Shakespeare, but for 'national,' German pride surely none whatever. And yet that little game of transmutation is constantly going on.

The subject of Shakespeare is an alluring one, and one could go on *ad infinitum*; but there are other striking instances of the patriotic paralysis which should not be passed over. Thus, Hermann Grimm tells us in all gravity and good faith that Cornelius—Cornelius!—was the greatest painter of the century. As for Goethe, merely to name him is the letting out of waters. Richard Meyer tells us that *Faust* is 'the grandest drama of the world's literature;' Heinemann that the Roman Elegies are 'unequalled' (for comic, though humourless, impropriety, no doubt; but that is not what he intends). As a lyric poet he is 'perhaps the greatest of all time' in Strauss's opinion; 'the

greatest of lyric poets,' without the 'perhaps,' says Lavater. One bold worshipper at the Goethe shrine has even called him the 'greatest,' not of poets, but 'of men.' When a fine critic like Vischer or Otto Ludwig ventures to hint that Shakespeare was a greater dramatist than Goethe or Schiller, he is blamed for his lack of 'patriotism'; and Bulthaupt, a critic not quite of Vischer or Ludwig's rank, is commended for his 'patriotism' in writing a big book to prove the contrary. Then we have the Germans 'quite falsely giving themselves the credit of originating what is called the "romantic" sentiment about women' (Matthew Arnold), and of course declaring that they are 'the people with the greatest aptitude for the uplifting of barbarians [are Poles and Czechs included?] to civilisation' (Ernst Hasse). It has even become necessary for a serious German philological review (the *Philologische Wochenschrift*) to congratulate the author of a new history of the Vandals on his having 'abstained from all phrases aiming at Pan-Germanic patriotism'; and a scholar like Domaszewski, one of the best living authorities on the Roman Empire, cannot write a learned article in a learned periodical (*Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher* for 1900) on the 'Pay of the Roman Troops under the Empire' without a virtuous raising of the hands over that 'mercenary' Tommy Atkins, who gets a shilling a day and is a volunteer, whereas German Michael gets threepence and is a conscript. And of course the poor Tommies *solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant*, and all the rest of the foolish learned apparatus. What is all this but patriotic paralysis, from which even German *Wissen-*

schaft is not secure? And what is patriotic paralysis but a grievous confounder of the judgment?

I am, Sir, &c.,

WILLIAM T. ARNOLD.

NOTE 6, PAGE 54.

GERMANY AND HOLLAND.

To the Editor of the 'Spectator.'

SIR,—Your correspondent 'Vigilans sed Æquus' in his very interesting letter on 'Germany and Holland' which appears in the *Spectator* of March 14 suggests that it might interest your readers to have some account of the views of recent Dutch writers on the subject of the relations between Germany and Holland. Though not pretending to any exhaustive knowledge of the subject, I have followed the Dutch press with some care during the last three years, and would venture, if you think the matter of sufficient interest, to give some brief account of the more recent developments of the controversy in Holland. Your correspondent quotes Francke to the effect that the conclusion to be drawn from the controversy in the Dutch press is that the adherents of union have gained in number and weight, but that its opponents are still in the majority. Francke's prepossessions have, I think, coloured his views; at any rate, the impression produced on me by my reading of the Dutch papers would lead me to state the matter differently, and to say that while the advocates of union

of some sort between Germany and Holland include in their ranks some writers of marked ability, the union party is a very small minority, the great mass of the people remaining firmly opposed to the slightest sacrifice of Holland's independence, commercial or political, to Germany or any other Power.

Your correspondent sketches the development of the controversy in Holland from its rise in 1896, at the time of the Kaiser's telegram, to the year 1900, when, as he says, an ebb set in. In the early months of last year the tide began to flow again, and flowed all through the summer with considerable force. It is of this recrudescence of the controversy that I propose, with your permission, to give a brief account. The matter is of interest to Englishmen, seeing that the occasion of the outburst was the appearance of certain English writings, in which a very hostile verdict was passed on Holland's government of her colonies, and her loss of those colonies was confidently predicted as an event of the near future. The writings in question were an article by an American, Mr. Barbour Lathrop, which appeared in the *Straits Times* of March 12, 1902, under the title 'Our Neighbours: Decay of the Dutch East Indies'; Mr. Archibald Colquhoun's 'The Mastery of the Pacific'; and a review of the latter work in the columns of the *Engineer* of April 11, 1902. That such writings, appearing at a time when every Dutchman's heart was full of bitter anger against England, and aching with passionate sympathy for the Boers, and when Lord Salisbury's gibe at the 'dying nations' was still fresh in men's memories, should have caused considerable excitement in Holland is

hardly to be wondered at. The Dutch journal *Het Vaderland* drew attention in its issues of April 20 and 21 to the pronouncements of Barbour Lathrop and Colquhoun, and argued that an attempt was being made to work up a public opinion against Holland on account of her alleged colonial misgovernment. The Utrecht *Dagblad* naturally found this an excellent opportunity for recurring to its advocacy of an alliance with Germany, and pointedly asked the *Vaderland* what steps it proposed should be taken in face of the 'English danger.' The *Vaderland* replied ('Het Engelsche (?) gevaar in den Oost-Aziatischen Archipel,' May 4 and 5, 1902) that if danger threatened from England or from any particular Power an alliance in some direction or other would be the only means of protecting the integrity of Holland's dominions, but that it did not consider there was any proof of the existence of any such special danger. On this the Utrecht paper became quite dithyrambic, maintained that danger threatened from England, Japan, and Australia, urged again with vehemence that Holland should ally herself with Germany, and expressed its strong preference for a military alliance as against a mere Customs Union. Many articles urging these views appeared in the columns of the *Dagblad* during the summer months of last year, the matter being thus summed up in an article which appeared on August 1: 'For an Empire which, like the German Empire of to-day, holds that its future is on the sea, its strategic and economic union with the mouths of the Rhine cannot be a matter of indifference. And that is the premium, the assurance premium, which we have to

REDWOOD LIBRARY
NEWPORT, R. I.

offer in return for a guarantee of our territorial integrity in Europe and in our colonies.'

The views of the *Utrechtsche Dagblad* received little support in the Dutch press, and they evoked a spirited protest from General Den Beer Portugael, a member of the Dutch Privy Council, who, in an able pamphlet entitled 'Nederland en Duitschland,' summarised the controversy so far as it had gone, quoting Barbour Lathrop, Colquhoun, and the chief German writers on the subject, and vigorously contesting the arguments of the *Dagblad* in favour of an alliance with Germany. 'Germany's strategic and economic union with the mouths of the Rhine our assurance premium!' says he in amazement. 'How is it possible that such a thing can seem desirable to any thinking Netherlander, and that there can be found others to agree with him?' General Den Beer Portugael discusses first a Customs Union, passing on to the consideration of a political and military alliance, and pronounces equally emphatically against both.

'The economic disadvantages for us of a Customs Union with Germany are generally recognised. An indispensable condition of such union would be the sacrifice of our free-trade system, and with it the prosperity of numberless industrial concerns throughout the country. The Utrecht paper supports its advocacy of a German alliance by the statement in its issue of June 1 that we are all aware that our industry is decaying. The statement is erroneous. It is possible that certain concerns are decaying, but our industry as a whole is not decaying. The output of many of

our textile factories has increased during the past eight years by from fifty to sixty per cent. We export to all parts of the world, Germany and England included. "In consequence of the German protective system having enhanced the price in that country of machinery, petroleum, oil, leather, and other articles of necessity in a factory, our textile industry has made a great stride forward." Thus a well-known firm at Enschede in their report for this year. On January 1, 1901, there were in the Twenthe district 297,338 spindles and 21,261 looms for cotton alone; on January 1, 1902, the numbers had risen to 317,000 and 22,000 respectively. Is that decay? "Protection," says another Enschede firm, "would make cheap production, which is indispensable if we are to compete with England and America, impossible for us."'

'It is impossible,' says he, 'to realise all the economic consequences of a commercial union with Germany. Against increased export to Germany we must put diminished export to other countries, difficulties concerning the "most-favoured-nation" clause in our commercial treaties, &c., but, above all, the fact that we should no longer be able to determine our own and our colonies' commercial policy, which would be settled in Berlin. We should, indeed, have a voice, but it would, in most cases, be a voice crying in the wilderness, and however bitter one's experiences in such a commercial union, when once entered into it would be impossible to break away from it. A commercial union would thus be merely the first step towards a closer union—viz. a military alliance—and

a military alliance is for a small State merely a slow, methodical, and voluntary annexation, or rather dissolution of nationality; this is in the nature of things. Were Germany to guarantee our territorial integrity, all that we should notice during the first few years would be the receipt of friendly hints from Berlin, first to adopt a longer term of service for our militia, then to enlarge our army, then the fleet, to put our coast defences in order, strengthen their armament, and so on. Later on we should be told that as she guaranteed our security she must be enabled to see to the strengthening and garrisoning of our defences. The command of our army and navy would pass by a natural process into German hands. It comes, in fact, to this, that in order to assure our independence we should begin by sacrificing it; that in order to avoid an imaginary danger we should rush headlong into a very real one. Another consequence of an alliance would be that we should have to share all Germany's political worries and anxieties, while having no real voice in her high politics. We should simply have to follow at Germany's heels, obedient and subdued, *for ever*, for, once bound, it is inconceivable that we should ever be released. Professor Anton, Dr. Heckscher, and other sympathetic German writers may conceive of an alliance between the two countries with complete preservation of our independence; in practice, however, the thing is impossible, as being contrary to the nature of things. In all important economic, political, and colonial matters we should have to dance to another's piping; we should no longer be master in our own house. For that we are

too old. We will not contemplate any such arrangement, and, what is more, we need not.

'We are not great and powerful like the Great Powers of to-day, that is true; but we are strong enough *to remain what we are, free and independent*, if we are determined to do so! In the territories we have to defend we could, with our army of a hundred and sixty to a hundred and seventy thousand men, armed with good rifles, abundantly supplied with ammunition, with a large number of small-calibre quick-firing guns, backed up by heavy ordnance and by the population, do wonders. To look to our defences, not at another's bidding and on another's behalf, but for our own sake, so that a feeling of confidence and trust in our own powers may inspire the whole nation, that must be our assurance premium, a premium paid not to others, but to ourselves, in that respect resembling the insurance funds of such great companies as the Netherlands Steamship Company, which do not weaken the Company, but, on the contrary, add to its strength and prestige. And if we look sharply to our defences, it is not because danger threatens, but with a view to making the approach of danger less likely. No one threatens us, no one thinks of annexing us; but we must go forward, steadily strengthening our position, so that we may not at some unfortunate moment present in our weakness an irresistible temptation to some Great Power, and so that if the unhappy time should arrive which shall bring the terrors of a general war to our frontiers, we, free and independent, shall be able to decide for ourselves what steps it may be best to take to keep

ourselves out of the struggle; or, if that should become impossible, to enter into an alliance *for the duration of the war only*, throwing our weight into the scale against that one of the belligerent parties which should fail to respect our neutrality. Confidence in our own powers must not, however, make us blind to matters needing improvement, and whose reform would place our national existence and our colonial authority on a still firmer basis. One powerful means to this end would be the extension of our language. Our language, the foundation-tongue of the Netherlands, with its allied Flemish, is spoken far beyond our frontiers, from Emden to Dunkirk along the coast, in Cleves, by four hundred thousand persons in North America, and throughout the whole of South Africa from the Cape to the Zambesi. It would be well worth our while to pay attention to the complaints of Flemings and South Africans, who cry out for simplification of the difficult language of our books.

'Many of our Consulates are occupied by Germans. This ought not to be. Our foreign commercial policy should remain a very liberal one, so that we may be to Germany a convenience as regards her export trade, and never a stumbling-block and rock of offence. Nor should we raise difficulties when there is talk of deepening the Rhine from Cologne to Rotterdam. Let us live with Germany as neighbours, in ever greater brotherliness, *but not in each other's houses*. By such a policy both will be gainers.'

There has, so far as I am aware, been no serious attempt to reply to General Den Beer Portugael's pamphlet, since whose appearance in August last the

controversy seems to have again, for the time at any rate, died down.

I am, Sir, &c.,
ORANJE BOVEN.

The following letter also appeared in the same issue of the *Spectator* :—

SIR,—In reference to the last of the admirable letters of 'Vigilans sed Æquus' in the *Spectator* of March 14, the following may be interesting. Some fifteen years ago I heard a Dutch lady tell this story, which indicates (as did many other things she said) the strong suspicion of German aims that existed in Holland. A certain Dutch diplomatist of high position, on a visit to Berlin, was attending a review at Potsdam, and Bismarck, who had him in charge, and was anxious to impress him to the utmost with the military spectacle, was surprised, as regiment after regiment went by, at his invariable comment, 'Not tall enough, not tall enough.' At length, a Guards battalion of particularly fine physique having passed, was received with the same 'Not tall enough,' and Bismarck, nettled, asked the Hollander how he could expect to see anywhere finer men than these before him. The answer was: 'Yes, they are tall, but when we open the dykes in Holland we can flood the country to 10 ft., so your soldiers would be still not tall enough.'

I am, Sir, &c.,
H. E. B.

INDEX

Africa, German colonies in, 12
Agriculture, in England and Germany, 6, 7; in the future, 24; in Holland, 58
Algeria, 88
American meat excluded from Germany, 30, 50
Amran, L. von, quoted, 83; on Britain's sea power, 90
Anatolian railway, 75
Anglo-German alliance, ix, 69, 70
Anton, Prof., xvi; quoted, 52; on German policy, 55; on the resources of Java, 57; on Customs Union for Holland and Germany, 58, 59, 63, App. 119
Antwerp, 29, 63, 64
Argentine, 45; wheatfields, 25
Armenia, 4; massacres in, App. 100
Arndt, Prof., xvi; quoted, 21; on trade wars, 24; on preferential trade, App. 106
Arnold, Matthew, quoted, 18, 19, App. 113
Arnold, W. T., letter on patriotic paralysis in Germany, App. 110–114
Asia Minor, wheat from, 25; Germans in, 75, 76
Australia, App. 116; and New Guinea, 12; and preferential trade, App. 104, 105
Austria, 26, 72, 73, App. 107
Authorities cited, lists of, 3–5, 21, 22, 34, 35, 52, 53, 83, 84

Bagdad railway, 75
Balfour, Mr., on German ill-will towards England, xiii *n*, xv
Balkan Peninsula, 26, App. 101
'Battle of Dorking,' 82, 83
Bernays, Jacob, 66
Bessarabia, 72
Bismarck, Prince, Delbrück on, xiii; Von Sybel on, xv; on the Seven Years' War, xvii; on colonies for Germany, 11; and German Protectorates, 14; on treaties, 70; his secret relations with Turkey, App. 99–101; anecdote concerning, App. 122
Black Sea, 72
Bley, Fritz, works by, 21, 53, 83; on Java, 28; on England's enemies, 33; pamphlet on Holland, 55; on Germany's position, xiv, 84–87
Blockade, German dread of, 7, 8
Boer war, attitude of Germany during the, 1–4, 86, 87, App. 101–104; and Holland, 28

Borneo, 60
Bosphorus, 75
Brassey, Lord, 3
Brazil, 45, 46; German emigration to, 31, 40, 41
Bremen, 63, 64
Brest, 92
Bright, John, xvii
Britain, alliance between Germany and, ix, 69; cause of German enmity towards, xiii *n*, 15, 18, 38, 39; foreign policy of, xvii–xix; and German unity, xvii, 17; agriculture in, 6; and exclusive trade areas, 8, 23; and the Canadian tariff, 10; foreign envy of, 10, 11; Zollverein for, 9, 21, App. 104–106; Swiss trade with, 27; and the United States, 31; enemies of, 33; Germany's ill-will towards, x, 52; and the Dutch colonies, 59; friendly attitude towards Germany in China, 79; the sea-power of, 89 *seq.*; invasion of, 93 *seq.*
Britain, on the use of the term, xix
British army, German press on the, 4, 86, App. 99–102
British fleet, 89–97
British Zollverein, 21, App. 104–106
'Buckinghamshire Correspondence,' App. 106–108
Buckinghamshire, Earl of, App. 107, 108
Bulgaria, 72
Bulthaupt on Shakespeare and Goethe, App. 113
Bute, Lord, 15, 16, App. 106–109

Calvin, his influence on the Dutch, 66, 67
Calwer, works by, 22, 34; on the exclusion of American meat from Germany, 30, 50; on German and American tariffs, 49–51
Canada, 24, App. 104
Canadian differential tariff for free-trading states, 10
Cape-Cairo railway, 13
Cape Colony, 60
Caribbean Sea, ix
Carlyle, Thomas, 19
Central America, 38, and the United States, 42, 45
Central European Zollverein, 25, 26
Chamberlain, Mr., App. 105
Chatham, Earl, 15
Chicago, 35
Chile, 45
China, Germans in, 11; German designs on, 77–81; as trade-competitor, 80
Choiseul, Duc de, 16, App. 106
Coleridge quoted, vi
Collingwood, Admiral, 91, 92
Collyer, Mrs. D'Arcy, 16; letter on Lord Bute, App. 106–109
Cologne, App. 121
Colomb, Admiral, 93
Colonies, Germany's need of, 7, 11, 28, 57
Comédie Française in Holland, 66
Colquhoun, Archibald, App. 115–117
Constantinople, App. 99–100
Copenhagen, 36, 37
Cornelius, painter, App. 112
Crete, 4
Crimea, 4; English landing in, 93
Crimean Treaty of Peace, 72
Crœsus, 76
Cuba, the war in, 31, 38, 43
Curaçao, 57

Customs Union, Central European, 21; for Holland and Germany, 28, 29, 55–64, App. 116, 117
'Cynthia's Way' quoted, 1
Czechs, 18, 85, App. 113

Dagblad, Utrecht paper, quoted, 54, App. 116, 117
Danish West Indian islands, on the transfer of, 36–39
Danube, 56, 72, 73
Dehn, works by, 3, 22; on the Canadian tariff, 10; on England's colonial policy, 32, 33
Delbrück, Dr. Hans, xvi, 83; on Bismarck, xiii; on Pan-Germanism, 27; on Russia, 71; on German insults to England, 4, 86; a letter in defence of, App. 101, 102
Denmark, 26; and the transfer of her West Indian islands, 37–39
Deutsche Revue quoted, 3, 84, 90
Deutsche Rundschau quoted, 5, 35
Diezmann on Russia, 70; on East Germany, 74
Differential treatment of British goods in Rhodesia proposed, 9; in Canada, 10; of German sugar in the United States, 50
Dix, works by, 3, 35; on the German Malacca scheme, 13, 77, 78; on the transfer of the Danish West Indian Islands, 37–39; on the German settlement in Brazil, 40, 41
Dnieper, river, 73
Domaszewski quoted, App. 113
Dortmund-Ems canal, 64
Drummond, J. D., letter in defence of Prof. Delbrück, App. 101, 102
Duff, Sir Mountstuart Grant, 4
Dutch colonies, 28, 59; language, 64, 65, App. 121; sympathies for France, 66; press on the union of Holland and Germany, App. 114 *seq.*

Egypt, German designs on, 13, 76, 77; Napoleon's landing in, 93
Ehrenberg quoted, 74
Eisenhart, Dr. Karl, quoted, 83, 96; on Samoa, 89
Emden, 63, 64
Emigration from Germany, 7, 46–49
Ems, 88
'Enemies of England, The,' 15, *Engineer*, App. 115
England (see under Britain)
Enschede, App. 118
Euphrates, river, 75
European 'combine' against the United States suggested in Germany, 50, 51
European Zollverein, 25, 26
Exclusive trading areas, 8, 23–28
Export trade, of Germany, 6–9, 49–51; as the index of prosperity, 24; of Switzerland, 26, 27; of the United States, 44, 51; of Holland, App. 118

Fallmerayer, 75
'Faust,' App. 112
Ferdinand of Prussia, 16
Finland, 72
Fleet Bill of 1898 (German), 5
Fleet, British, 89–97
Fleet Literature of Germany, 2–8, 17, 20

Fleet union for Holland and Germany, 28, 29
France, 33, App. 107, 108; exclusive trading areas of, 8, 9; and Egypt, 13, 76; trade with Switzerland, 27; Dutch sympathies for, 66
Francke, works by, 4, 53; on world empires, 8; on a British Zollverein, 9; on Swiss trade, 27; on Holland and Germany, 29, 56, 60, 63, 64, App. 114
Franco-German war, xvii, 66, 95, 96
Frederick the Great, 15, 16, App. 106 *seq.*
Free trade, 9; the peace-keeping action of, 10; in Holland, 29, 55, 61; in England, 105
French language gaining on German in Switzerland, 27
Fuchs, Prof., advice to Germans, 14
Funke, work by, 22, 35; on German emigration to Brazil, 32, 41; on German trade, 84

Gambetta, 95
Geibel, poet, App. 111
Geiger, biographer of Goethe, App. 111
German pamphleteers, v–vii
German press, on England and Boer war, 4, 86, 87, App, 101–104; on the British Navy, 90, 96; French retort to accusations of the, App. 99–101
German-Brazilian Union, 40
'Germania Triumphans' quoted, 35, 49, 73, 77, 83, 96
Germany, aspirations of, ix, x, 20, 21, 32, 33; and the United States, xvi, 29, 30, 34–51; dread of Russia, x, 52, 68–81; ill-will towards Great Britain during the Boer war, 1–4, 86, 87, App. 101–104; Fleet literature of, 2–8, 17, 20; food supply of, 5–8; agriculture in, 6; export trade of, 6–9, 49–51; population of, 7; emigration from, 7, 40, 46–49; necessity of a great fleet for, 7; and the Canadian tariff, 10; 'successes' of, 11–13; cause of enmity towards England, xiii *n*, 15, 18, 38, 39; 'Patriotic Paralysis in,' 19, App. 110–114; tariff of, 21, 49; and a Central European Zollverein, 25, 26; language frontier of Germany in Switzerland, 27; and Holland, 27–29, 52–67, App. 114–122; Protectionist policy of, 29, 55, 61; fears of Russia and the United States, 29, 30, 52; and the exclusion of American meat, 30, 50; as England's enemy, 33; and the Kaiser's telegram about the Jameson Raid, 54, 55, 88, 89; German view of, 84–89, App. 111; sea power of, 92, 93; secret relations with Turkey, App. 99–101
— Emperor William II. of, x, App. 100
Gibraltar, 90
Gladstone, W. E., xvii.
Goethe, xiii, App. 111; on England's foreign policy, xviii; his influence on the Dutch, 67; on 'law and necessity,' 80; German estimation of his works, App. 112, 113
Gothic architecture, App. 111
Graspan, 4

Grenville, George, App. 108
Grenzboten quoted, 4, 22; on German Colony-staleness, 14; articles on Holland, 53, 85; on the Union of Holland and Germany, 60; on East Germany, 74
Grimm, Hermann, App. 112
'Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um 1950,' quoted, 22, 29, 72, 73, 77, 84, 85
Guatemala, 45

H., Captain, quoted, 84; on the invasion of England, 93–96
Haeckel, Prof., App. 110
Hague, *Courant* quoted, 55
Halle, Prof. Ernst von, work by, 22, 35, 53; on dear bread in the future, 25; on the Rhine, 28, 56; on Holland and the Boer war, 28; on Holland and Germany, 29, 58–61, 64; on Germans in the United States, 29; on German unfriendliness to the United States about Cuba, 31; on German emigration, 48; on the Danube, 56, 73; on England's policy, 88
Haller, quoted, 35
Halys, river, 76
Hamburg, 8, 64
Hamburg America Line, 38, 39
'Handels- und Machtpolitik,' quoted, 4, 8, 42, 74, 78, 87, 88
Hanseatic Colonisation Society, 40, 41
Hart, Sir Robert, 79
Hasse, Dr. Ernst, quoted, 22; on a Central European Zollverein, 26; on Germany's position, 84, App. 113
Hauran, wheat in the, 25
Heckscher, quoted, 53; on the danger to the German South Sea colonies from Holland's loss of her possessions in the Far East, 61; on the union of Holland and Germany, App. 119
Heinemann, quoted, App. 112
Heligoland, 17
Helmolt's 'New History of the World,' quoted, 80
Herwegh, on Germany's mission, 85
Het Vaderland, App. 115, 116
Holland, 21, 25, 33, 50, 87; and union with Germany, 27–29, 52–67; App. 114–122, and her colonies, 28, 59; Free trade in, 29, 55, 61; agriculture in, 58
Hong-kong, Germans in, 11, 12, 78, 79
— and Shanghai Bank, 11
— and Whampoa Dock Co., 11
Hunziker, quoted, 22

Ile de France, App. 111
Imports, on the increase of, 24; of the United States, 44, 45
India, supposed attack on, 70
Invasion of England, 93, 96
Isthmian Canal (Panama), 38, 39, 44, 45, 57
Italy, 26

Jameson Raid, 54
Japan, 80, App. 116
Java, 28; resources of, 57
Jervis, Sir John, 91

Kansas, 47
Kattegat, 90
Koenig, quoted, 6
Konia, 76

Kossman, quoted, 53
Kraus, quoted, App. 111
Kruger, Ex-President, 88, 89

Lamb, Charles, 4
Lassalle, 74
Lathrop, Mr. Barbour, App. 115–117
Lavater, quoted, App. 113
Lecky, W. E. H., 15
Lexis, quoted, 56
Lieber, Francis, on Germans in America, 47; on the Dutch language, 64, 65; on the Crimean Treaty of Peace, 72, 73
Livonius, Vice-Admiral, article in *Deutsche Revue*, 3, 84; on the danger of a Protectionist policy for England, 10; on English seamanship and sea power, 90–93; on the invasion of England, 93
Ludwig, Otto, App. 113
Luxemburg, 67

Macedonian crisis, App. 100
McKinley, President, 44
M'Millan, Sir Wm., on British Zollverein, App. 104–106
Magyars, 18, 85
Malacca, Straits of, 13
Malay Peninsula, 77
Marcks, Prof., xvi; work by, 3, 22; on the Seven Years' War, 16–17; on German fears of Russia, 29, 69
Marine Rundschau, quoted, 84, 89–90, 93
Melanesia, 12
Mesopotamia, 75; wheat-growing in, 25
Mexico, 45
Meyer, Richard, App. 112
Milton, App. 111
Minnesota, 47
Missouri, 47
Mitchell, Sir Andrew, App. 107, 108
Moltke, Count von, 73
Monroe Doctrine, 32; Sir Frederick Pollock on the, 35; German writers on the, 41; defined, 42, 43
Moulin-Eckart, quoted, xv, 84; on the policy of Britain, 88

Napoleon Buonaparte, Sir Walter Scott on, xviii; and the Dutch, 66; his landing in Egypt, 93
Nation, Berlin paper, quoted, 53
'Nauticus,' works by, 3, 22, 35, 85; on the danger of blockade to Germany, 8; on the battles of the future, 23; on the friendship between the United States and England, 31; on the Monroe Doctrine, 42; quotes Bismarck on fidelity to treaty, 70; on the British Navy, 89, 90
Naval Annual, 3
Navy League, 90
Netherlands Steamship Co., App. 120
Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher, quoted, App. 113
New Guinea, 12
New South Wales and the Canadian tariff, 10
Niebuhr, quoted, 1
Nietzsche, quoted, 83
Nineteenth Century, quoted, 35
Novoe Vremya, quoted, 71

Odessa, 72
'Oranje Boven,' letter to the *Spectator*, App. 114–122

Panama Canal, 38, 39, 45, 57
Pan-German Union, publications of the, xiv, 35, 43, 55, 82–84
Paris, Gaston, xiv
Peel, George, 'The Enemies of England,' 15, App. 106
Pekin, 5, 14
Persian Gulf, 75
Peter III. of Russia, App. 108
Philippines, American annexation of the, 42, 44
Philologische Wochenschrift, App. 113
Pitt, William, App. 109
Pohle, Prof., work by, 22, 35; on German export trade, 50; on a tariff war with the United States, 50, 51
Poland, 56, 72, 73
Polenz, W. von, quoted, 35
Poles, 18, 85, App. 113
Pollock, Sir Frederick, quoted, 35, 37
Population of Germany, 6, 7
Portugael, General Den Beer, App. 117, 121
Portugal, 33, 60
Posen, 74
Preferential railway rates, 29
Preussische Jahrbücher, quoted, 53, 70, 71, 83, App. 103
Protection, the policy of, 10; in Germany, 29, 55, 61; in the United States, 30, 49; for Holland, App. 118
Prussia, 16, App. 106–110
Puerto Rico, 38
Pulo Lantar Islands, 13, 77
Punch, quoted, 17

Railway rates, preferential, 29; of Germany, 64
Rathgen, work by, 3, 22; on differential tariffs, 10; on the redistribution of colonies at Britain's expense, 33
Ratzel, work by, 4, 22, 84; on England's policy, xviii; on blockades, 8; on the English occupation of Egypt, 13; on sea wars, 23; on sea training, 92
Red Sea, 13
Redistribution of the world in 1915, 48, 49, 73
Reismann-Grone, quoted, 53; on Dutch and German ports, 62, 64; on Dutch sympathies for the French, 66
Rhine, river, 28, 29, 56, 64, App. 116, 117, 121
Rhodes, Cecil, 13
Rhodesia, 10
Rio Grande do Sul, 32
Rodbertus, on the heirship of Turkey, 74, 75
Rohrbach, quoted, 22; on wheat-growing in Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 25
Ross, 75
Rotterdam, 28, 62, 64, App. 121
Roumania, 26, 72
Roumanian railways, 62
Royal Historical Society, App. 106
Ruskin, John, 19
Russia, 21, 26, 28, 33, 52, App. 107; German fears of, x, 29, 68–81; exclusive trading areas of, 8, 9, 23, 26; and Egypt, 13
— Peter III. of, App. 108
Rust, Captain, 78
Ruville, Albert von, App. 109

St. John, island of, 37
St. Thomas, island of, 37, 39
St. Vincent, battle of, 91
Sainte Croix, island of, 37
Salisbury, Lord, App. 115
Salonica, 72

Samoa, 12, 17, 18, 39, 89
Santa Catharina, 40, 41
Sarcey, Francisque, 66
Scaliger and Dutch scholarship, 66
Scandinavia, 26
Schiemann, Prof., App. 101; work by, 4; on the English occupation of Egypt, 13, 76; on the loss of Zanzibar, 17, 18; on war between Russia and Germany, 71
Schiller, App. 113
Schmoller, Prof., App. 101; works by, 4, 22; on English agriculture, 6; on German emigration, 7; on colonies, 11; on German prospects, 21; on sea power, 23; on South America, 31, 32
Schowalter, App. 103
Schumacher, on Germans in China, 11, 78; on annexation in China, 80–82
Schurtz, Heinrich, article by, 4, 22; on German colonial expansion, 12–15; on German 'outlands,' 26, 74
Scott, Sir Walter, xviii
Seeley's 'Expansion of England,' xvii, xviii
Sering, Prof., 4; on the population of Germany, 6, 7; on trade areas, 8, 9; on British self-conceit, 18; on the Monroe Doctrine, 42; on Britain's Continental policy, 87
Seven Years' War, xvii, 16, App. 106
Shakespeare, App. 111, 112
Shanghai, 13, 79, App. 110; industries of, 81
Shantung, 79
Sidgwick, Mrs. Alfred, 1
Siècle, quoted, App. 99–101
Silesia, App. 107
Singapore, 60, 92
Skager Rack, 90
South Africa, App. 104; Dutch language in, App. 121
South America and Germany, 31, 32, 40, 41, 43–46, 74; and the United States, 42–45; future of, 45, 46
Spain, 33, 37; and the war with America, 59
Spectator, author's thanks to the editor of, xix; on the Blockade Peril, 8; on American hostility to Germany, 36; on German aspirations, 70; letters on Prof. Delbrück, App. 101–104; W. T. Arnold's letter on Patriotic Paralysis in Germany, 19, App. 110–114; Oranje Boven's letter to, App. 114–122
Staël, Madame de, 83
Standaard, Dutch paper, quoted, 54
Stanhope, Lord, 15
Steig, R., App. 112
Strachey, J. St. Loe, introduction by, v–xi
Straits of Malacca, 13
Straits Settlements, 78
Straits Times, App. 115
Strasburg, 89
Strauss, quoted, App. 112
Stubmann, quoted, 53, 62
Sulina, 72
Sumatra, 57
Surinam, 57
Sweden, 26, 72
'Swiftsure,' H.M.S., 93
Switzerland, 25; export trade of, 26, 27; the Vetter case in, 22; no German 'province,' 27

Täglichе Rundschau, App. 103
Tariff, German, 21, 49; American, 50

Tariff war between Germany and the United States, 30; between Europe and the United States, 50, 51
Texas, 7
Times, on German enmity towards England, 15, 16, App. 106; on German relations with Turkey, 99–101
Trade wars, 23
Trading areas, exclusive, 8, 23–28
Trafalgar, battle of, 91
Transvaal, 4, 59
Transvaal war, 28; German press on the, 86, 87, App. 101–104
Treitschke, quoted, xv, 1
Triple Alliance, 50, App. 100
Trübner, quoted, 47
Tryon, Admiral, 92
Turkey, 72, 74, 77; and the Bagdad Railway, 75; secret relations with Germany, App. 99–101
— Abdul Hamid, Sultan of, App. 99–101
Tutuila, 39

Uganda Railway, 13
United States, 21, 25–28; and Germany, xvi, 29, 30, 34–51; exclusive tendencies of trade in, 8, 9, 23; high protective duties of the, 30, 48–50; and England, 31; and the Monroe Doctrine, 32, 41 *seq.*; and the transfer of the Danish West India Islands, 36–39; cause of hostility to Germany, 36; trade with Central and South America, 44, 45; and German emigrants, 47; European 'combine' against the, 50, 51; and the Dutch colonies, 59; and Samoa, 89; Pan-German prophecies of war with Germany, 96, 97
Utrecht Dagblad, quoted, 54, App. 116, 117

Van Houten, quoted, 53, 54; on Holland as a base against England, 56; on the Dutch Colonies, 61; on the remoteness of the kinship between Holland and Germany, 64; on present-day Holland, 66, 67
Venezuela, ix, 4, 46; English concessions in, 31
Venice Campanile, 15
'Verein für Socialpolitik,' 53
Vetter case in Switzerland, 22
Vigny, Alfred de, 91
Vischer, on Shakespeare and Goethe, App. 113
Vistula, river, 56
Voigt, quoted, 4; on England's food supply, 6; on agriculture in Germany, 6
Volga, river, 73
Von Bernhardy, quoted, xv
Von Brandt, quoted, 5; on Germany and China, 14
Von Sybel, quoted, xv

Wagner, Prof., 4
Waltershausen, Sartorius von, works by, 35, 53; on the Danish West India Islands, 37; on the American tariff, 50, 51; on a Customs union between Holland and Germany, 58, 59
West Indies, Danish islands in the, 36–39
Wheat production, 24, 25
Wilhelmina, Queen, 66
Wilson Tariff, 50

Wintzer, Dr. W., 43–46
Wolff, Prof., 22; on wheat-growing, 24, 25; on North America, 29
'World empires,' the policy of, 7, 8

Yangtsze, river, 79
'Yellow Peril,' the, 80, 81
Yildiz Kiosk, App. 100

Zanzibar, 17
Zeitschrift für Socialpolitik, quoted, 53
Zollverein, German fear of a British, 9, 11; question of a British, 21, App. 104–106; Central European, 25, 26 the German, 58, 59

Redwood Library

SELECTIONS FROM THE RULES

1. Three volumes may be taken at a time and only three on one share. Two unbound numbers of a monthly and three numbers of a weekly publication are counted as a volume.

2. Books other than 7-day and 14-day ones may be kept out 28 days. **Books cannot be renewed or transferred.**

3. Books overdue are subject to a fine of one cent a day for fourteen days, **and five cents a day for each day thereafter.**

4. Neglect to pay the fine will debar from the use of the Library.

5. No book is to be lent out of the house of the person to whom it is charged.

6. Any person who shall soil (deface) or damage or lose a book belonging to the Library shall be liable to such fine as the Directors may impose; or shall pay the value of the book or of the set, if it be a part of a set, as the Directors may elect. All scribbling or any marking or writing whatever, folding or turning down the leaves, as well as cutting or tearing any matter from a book belonging to the Library, will be considered defacement and damage.

365/6

F°FG: V68

WITHDRAWN